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The explosive growth of cyberspace into many aspects of peoples’ lives over the 
last twenty years has been matched with an equally explosive growth in the number and 
sophistication of cyber incidents. Governments have recognized that these incidents pose 
a threat to the security and economy of their constituencies and use this reasoning as a 
basis for intervening on behalf of private entities. In this project, we compare the 
cybersecurity policies of the United States, United Kingdom, Israel, and Singapore to 
explore what the United States does to protect its private entities in cyberspace, what 
more it could be doing, and how decision makers could compare future policy options. 
Despite differences in focus, we found significant homogeneity between the policies of 
each government, with one gap in the U.S. approach—a long-term solution for the dearth 
of skilled cybersecurity workers. In conclusion, we provide a recommendation for 
expansion of U.S. subsidies for primary school education to meet this gap as well as an 
outcome-based framework to aid future analyses. 
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In response to the growing number of cyber incidents reported to the Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT) Coordinating Center, the United States (U.S.) 
government published the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace in 2003 (Bush, 2003) . 
The strategy outlined five domains of challenges in cyberspace: home users and small 
businesses, large enterprises, critical infrastructure sectors, national vulnerabilities, and 
the global information grid of networked systems (Bush, 2003). In releasing this strategy, 
the government officially recognized its role in the protection of U.S. entities in 
cyberspace. Key federal agencies were assigned to designated infrastructure sectors, to 
lead in the prevention, response and recovery from cyber-attacks (Bush, 2003). 
Since 2003, the cyber landscape has only become more complex. The 
introduction of smart phones heralded an age in which devices of all sorts are connected 
to an “Internet of things.” Advancements in web commerce and developments in “social 
networking” incented adoption of networked technologies around the world. 
The U.S. government has released a succession of policies and legislation to 
address the continuing evolution of cyberspace. These included the International Strategy 
for Cyberspace (Obama, 2011) and the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (S.754, 
2015). While later strategies focused on a more global approach to meeting cybersecurity 
challenges, all iterations of U.S. strategy shared a common central idea; a partnership 
between the public and private sectors (Presidential Decision Directive 63 (1998); Bush, 
2003; Obama, 2009; 2011; Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2013). This 
partnership model revolved around the creation of information sharing and analysis 
centers to identify existing and emerging vulnerabilities and left much of the 
responsibility of protection against and response to cyber threats in the hands of private 
entities. 
By the turn of the century, much of the U.S. economy had become fully integrated 
with and dependent on information technologies and infrastructures. This growth of 
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reliance paired with low risk to criminal activity led to an explosive growth in cyber 
threats. As a result, the voices of advocates for stronger protection and deeper 
government intervention grew in number and strength. 
In order to facilitate constructive debate, it would be helpful to distill and 
inventory what the U.S. government does to protect private entities in cyberspace, what 
they could do, and what the tradeoffs between models would be. 
The objective of this project is to study the role played by the U.S. government in 
the protection of private entities in cyberspace and identify if more needs to be done in 
light of known threats. Toward this objective, this project will seek to answer the 
following three questions: 
1. What is the United States doing to protect private entities in cyberspace? 
2. What other measures could the United States adopt to protect private 
entities in cyberspace? 
3. How can government decision-makers compare the tradeoffs of 
cybersecurity policy options at the national level? 
To answer the first question, this work reviews and analyzes existing literature on 
both U.S. government policy and legislation and industry information to identify the 
current U.S. approach to protecting private industries in cyberspace. 
To answer the second question, the U.S. model is compared with the 
cybersecurity models used by other governments and existing literature to identify other 
approaches or measures for consideration. The cybersecurity models of the following 
countries are chosen for comparison: 
 United Kingdom (UK): The UK is one of the United States’ closest allies 
and as well as one of the countries with the highest adoption of broadband 
Internet and e-commerce (Osula, 2015). The UK proposes to move more 
than 650 of its transactional services online via a single website for a 
projected savings of £1.7 to £1.8 billion a year (United Kingdom [UK] 
Cabinet Office, 2013). The UK National Security Council placed 
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cyberattack among the highest level of risks (UK Cabinet Office, 2010). 
This signified the emphasis and priority that the UK government placed on 
cyber defense (UK Cabinet Office, 2010). A government survey on cyber 
security breaches in the twelve months preceding April of 2017 estimated 
that a breach, on average, cost between £870,000 and £4.27 million for 
large businesses and £150,000 and £1.22 million for smaller firms (Klahr 
et al., 2017).  
 Israel: Israel is widely regarded as a world leader for scientific and 
technological innovations. Israel accounted for around 20% of the global 
cyber security sales (Forbes, 2017b). Israel has consolidated a wide range 
of government e-services (electronic services) and policies on-line, in 
three languages (English, Hebrew and Arabic) (GOV.IL, n.d.; United 
Nations, 2016). Two-thirds of Israel’s private firms sold goods and 
services online and nine in ten Israelis participated in e-commerce 
(Deborah, 2017). Kaspersky (2015) categorized Israel as a higher risk (in 
percentage of computers infected) than a majority of technologically 
advanced countries, suggesting a higher frequency of cyberattacks. Israel 
was also listed as one of the prime targets of advanced persistent threats 
(APTs) such as the Desert Falcons (Kaspersky, 2015). 
 Singapore: Since the launch of the Smart Nation Initiative in November 
2014, Singapore has been investing heavily to incorporate digital 
technologies and solutions into all aspects of work and life (Smart Nation, 
2017). Kaspersky (2015) listed the Singapore banking sector as the top 
target of financial malware (11.6% of Singapore users targeted at least 
once in 2015). 
To answer the third question, this work reviews existing literature on both general 
and cybersecurity-specific policy comparison models for analysis at the national level. 
Methods identified in research are employed to: normatively determine whether there is a 
role for government intervention providing cybersecurity, positively compare actions 
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taken by the four national governments to identify a possible menu of policy options for 
the United States’ consideration, and qualitatively conduct an analysis of alternative, 
incremental policy options to identify categories for future U.S. focus. 
This research concludes by issuing recommendations for the U.S. approach in 
providing cybersecurity for private entities, as well as identifies possible areas for further 
research. 
B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter highlights the growth of cybersecurity threats to introduce: the 
research questions of the necessity and sufficiency of U.S. intervention for private entity 
cybersecurity, the proposed comparative method for answering them, and nations that 
would be used in that analysis. 
Chapter II reviews the existing, open source literature to: introduce the concept of 
cybersecurity, identify the current approaches of the United States, UK, Israel, and 
Singapore to affect cybersecurity, and review potential methods for comparing 
cybersecurity policy options. 
Chapter III discusses the methods for comparing the positive actions taken by 
governments and normative standards for necessity and sufficiency. 
Chapter IV applies the methods defined in Chapter III to the information gleaned 
from the literature review as a use case. It identifies and analyzes a potential menu of 
cybersecurity policy options for U.S. government consideration. It further analyzes each 
of the defined cybersecurity categories to build an argument for the necessity of 
government intervention and the appropriate level of that intervention. 
In Chapter V, the authors recommend specific focus areas for U.S. government 
consideration, and propose areas for further study. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Lego produces a popular toy that consists of differently shaped, sized, and colored 
blocks that can be assembled in a number of ways limited only by imagination. Similarly, 
the Internet allows computerized devices of any make, model, location, or operating 
system to communicate using a connected infrastructure and a common set of protocols. 
Paired with rapid advances in computer technology and commensurate reductions in both 
size and cost, the Internet has radically accelerated how humans create and share 
information. Individuals, firms, and governments have all come to rely on the advantages 
provided by this information infrastructure. This reliance on computers and networks 
combined with low risks to criminal activity in cyberspace has led to a dramatic growth 
in cyber threats and, in turn, the need to understand what is being done to provide for 
cybersecurity. 
In this work, answers to the following questions are sought: 
1. What is the United States doing to protect private entities in cyberspace? 
2. What other measures could the United States adopt to protect private 
entities in cyberspace? 
3. How can decision makers compare the tradeoffs of cybersecurity policy 
options at the national level? 
To answer these questions it is necessary to set a foundation in the literature on an 
array of topics. This chapter defines the concept of cybersecurity and establishes why it is 
a nation-state issue. It identifies the United States’ current approach to protecting private 
entities. To provide the basis for comparison, it identifies the approach employed by the 
three foreign governments. Finally, it samples an array of methods to compare both 
general and cybersecurity-specific policy options. The summary and review of 
government, academia, and industry sources provides a base from which to identify gaps 





As with most advanced and somewhat nebulous subjects, there are as many 
definitions for cyberspace and cybersecurity as there are practitioners and academics in 
the field. While this may sound just as confusing as it can be when reviewing the 
literature or engaging in conversation about the topic, these definitions often have a 
common core. As this publication deals with the federal government’s approach to 
cybersecurity, the authors believe that using the government’s definition as the seed for a 
common definition is the most appropriate course, acknowledging that this definition 
shares the core of the various definitions used by others. The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) identifies cyberspace and cybersecurity as the 
following (National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST], 2012): 
Cyberspace—A global domain within the information environment 
consisting of the interdependent network of information systems 
infrastructures including the Internet, telecommunications networks, 
computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. 
Cyber Security—The ability to protect or defend the use of cyberspace 
from cyberattacks. 
The [U.S.] Cyberspace Policy Review of 2009 adds that “Common usage of the 
term [cyberspace] also refers to the virtual environment of information and interactions 
between people” (Obama, 2009, p. 1). 
In 2006, Knapp and Boulton claimed that cyber threats increasingly target private 
industry, showing as part of their supporting argument what appeared to be an 
exponential growth in the number of computer security incidents from 1988–2003 
(Knapp & Boulton, 2006). In 2010, then Deputy Secretary of Defense Lynn warned that 
U.S. military and civilian networks were “probed thousands of times and scanned 
millions of time [a day]” in the same year (2008) that military classified networks were 
compromised via introduction of malicious software on data sticks (Lynn, 2010, p. 97). 
Over the last year alone, allegations have been made of foreign governments 
illegally influencing the U.S. presidential election process and the ransoming of hundreds 
of thousands of computers via actions in cyberspace (Feldman, 2017; Center for Strategic 
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and International Studies [CSIS], 2017). The number of technologies that are integrated 
with networks, from watches to televisions to refrigerators, into the “Internet of Things” 
continues to grow, adding to the number of valuable targets for cyber threat actors. In the 
face of reports highlighting rapid growth and sophistication of cyber threats and resultant 
losses in both the public and private sectors, a desire to understand how the government 
approaches these threats is warranted. 
B. THE UNITED STATES’ APPROACH TO CYBERSECURITY 
The United States, in order to provide for checks and balances on the power of 
government, separated federal authorities between three branches: Executive, Legislative, 
and Judicial. The Legislative Branch, comprised of representatives from the states, 
introduces and passes laws that grant the federal government its authorities, among which 
are the levying of taxes and approval of budgets. The Executive Branch implements and 
enforces the laws passed by the Legislative Branch and is also charged with the defense 
of the nation with the sitting president as the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. 
Finally, the Judicial Branch has the role of interpreting laws and ruling on their 
constitutionality. These roles are relevant as they indicate that the U.S. approach to 
cybersecurity is grounded in the authorities identified and funds authorized in law by 
Congress and the administration of those by the president and his agencies; all subject to 
review by the Supreme Court. 
1. Cybersecurity Related Legislation 
Cybersecurity policy in the United States is founded in significant legislation, 
some far preceding the concept of computers or computer networks. Fischer (2013, 
Summary) identifies that “[m]ore than 50 statutes address various aspects of 
cybersecurity either directly or indirectly” beginning with the Posse Comitatus Act of 
1879 through the publication date of his research. The aggregate effects of legislation on 
the United States’ cybersecurity approach is shown in Figure 1 (Fischer, 2013). 
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Figure 1.  Effects of Legislation on U.S. Approach. 
Adapted from Fischer (2013). 
In 2014, President Obama signed into law the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act 
(S.1353, 2014). This law amended the NIST Act to empower the Secretary of Commerce 
to incorporate the advice and recommendations of private organizations into its 
development of cybersecurity standards and guidelines for the optional use of private 
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enterprise (specifically, CII) (S.1353, 2014). Additionally, it set guidelines for 
development of cybersecurity research and development as well as cybersecurity 
education and awareness. 
In 2015, President Obama signed the Cyber Security Information Sharing Act of 
2015. This legislation did several things: (1) it added responsibilities to federal agencies 
to improve information sharing between the federal government and state, local, tribal, 
and territorial (SLTT) governments as well as private organizations; (2) it gave DHS 
additional authorities over other government agencies; (3) it authorized the DOD to share 
threat indicators with other federal agencies; and (4) it extended the criminal penalties for 
fraud extraterritorially (S.754, 2015). 
From a review of existing legislation addressing cyberspace, a number of themes 
that influence the United States’ approach to cybersecurity were identified: 
1. The succession of amendments assigning/reassigning responsibilities to 
the federal agencies reflects an ongoing search to find an effective 
organizational structure for addressing cybersecurity. This indicates a 
belief that the correct combination of parts will result in a synergistic 
effect that will surmount the challenges within the domain. 
2. The distribution of responsibilities across the federal agencies indicates 
organization for a “whole of government” approach to cybersecurity. 
3. The same distribution of responsibilities results in a complex and 
confusing landscape. 
4. The legal authorities weigh heavily toward communication of cyber 
threats and investigation of and response to the same via the legal system. 
5. The need to balance civil liberties and privacy with security requirements 
presents a significant challenge both politically and practically. 
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2. Cybersecurity Related Executive Policy 
Since 1996, under the administrations of three presidents, the United States has 
issued numerous strategy and directive documents intended to define the role of the 
federal government in addressing threats to cybersecurity. Lowery (2014) asserted that 
the number of issuances correlate with a need to establish the authority of the relatively 
young Department of Homeland Security. These documents may also have reflected the 
presidents’ positions on a long running debate over the distribution of roles and 
authorities for cyberspace among the various government departments and agencies 
(Lowery, 2014; Schonberg, 2013). 
Martin (2013) posited that the United States recycles similar elements in each 
iteration of policy on cyberspace, locking itself into a paradigm. This independent review 
verifies a number of themes which reflect across the policy documents of most of the last 




Figure 2.  Cybersecurity Themes in U.S. Executive Issuances 
While many of the themes remained the same in each issuance, the ideas on how 
to address them have evolved over time. President Obama’s strategy document in 2011 is 
a notable example, which evolved the concept of international cooperation into a desire to 
develop new norms of global behavior in cyberspace (Obama, 2011). 
On the whole, the national and department level cybersecurity strategies largely 
serve to outline the government’s desired future and to signal to industry the types of 
capabilities it is interested in pursuing. Much of the practical information outlining how 
the government approaches cybersecurity exists in the directive documents. Presidential 
Policy Directive (PPD) 20, according to its unclassified fact sheet, establishes a policy of 
“least action” regarding the use of cyber operations (Presidential Policy Directive [PDD] 
20). Instead, it prioritizes defense of the networks and response via law enforcement. 
PPD 21 reestablishes DHS as the agency lead for critical infrastructure protection and 
provides direction to departments identified as “sector-specific agencies” (SSA), agencies 
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that have subject matter expertise over and relationships with an industry (e.g., DOD with 
the Defense Industrial Base) (Presidential Policy Directive [PDD] 21, 2013). PPD 41 
groups its approach to cybersecurity into four lines of effort and assigns a government 
focal point to each (Presidential Policy Directive [PPD] 41, 2016): 
 Threat Response encompasses actions to investigate and respond to cyber 
incidents primarily through intelligence analysis and law enforcement and 
is owned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 
 Asset Response encompasses efforts to technically protect or assist in the 
recovery of systems and is led by DHS. 
 Intelligence Support deals with ongoing intelligence collection, analysis, 
and sharing and is headed by the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI). 
 The fourth grouping addresses additional activities government agencies 
will undertake if they are the victim of the cyber incident and will be led 
by the respective agency. 
PPD 41 also provides for the instantiation of Cyber Response and Unified 
Coordination Groups to control the response to major cyber incidents (PPD 41, 2016).   
3. Practical Application of Cybersecurity Policy 
The United States does not publish a unified organization document for how if 
approaches cybersecurity. Much of the structure and operation can, however, be derived 
from federal law, executive and departmental strategy and directive documents, and 
Internet research. 
The U.S. approach to cybersecurity is split into four main facets, each headed by a 
different agency (summarized in Figure 3). 
The DOD’s role is “to defend DOD networks, systems, and information; defend 
the nation against cyberattacks of significant consequence; and support operational and 
contingency plans” (Department of Defense [DOD], 2015, p. 3). In addition to this 
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mission, it acts as the SSA for the Defense Industrial Base (Bush, 2003; PPD 41, 2016). It 
centralizes responsibility for these efforts with the joint operation of the U.S. Cyber 
Command and the National Security Agency. Depending on the magnitude of the event, 
the DOD could employ defensive cyber operations (DCO) to stop or mitigate a cyber 
incident directed at a private entity (DHS, 2013). 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) combats “cyber-based threats and attacks 
through the use of all available tools, strong public-private partnerships, and the 
investigation and prosecution of cyber threat actors” (2014, p. 10). In addition, through 
the FBI, the DOJ is responsible for operating the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task 
Force (NCIJTF) which acts as a fusion center for coordination between 20 agencies 
toward the investigation of cyber events (PPD 41, 2016). 
The ODNI manages the Intelligence Support function tasked in PPD 41 through 
the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) (PPD 41, 2016). The CTIIC 
performs all source analysis of cyber intelligence, shares with partner agencies, provides 
general interagency support, and advocates to keep intelligence at the lowest 
classification possible (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, n.d.). 
Finally, the DHS acts as the central agency to “safeguard and secure cyberspace” 
(DHS, 2017l, The Core Missions). As part of that mission, DHS operates the National 
Cybersecurity and Communications Center (NCCIC) (PPD 41, 2016; DHS, 2017). The 
NCCIC is comprised of four subordinate branches that act as the “intersection of the 
private sector, civilian, law enforcement, intelligence, and defense communities” (DHS, 




Figure 3.  U.S. Government-Run Cybersecurity Coordination Centers 
In addition to these four agencies, the United States identifies 16 critical 
infrastructure sectors in PPD 21 (PDD 21, 2013). Each of these sectors is partnered with 
a government agency who acts as both a subject matter expert for determining goals and 
standards as well as an advocate and point of contact for the industry (PDD 21, 2013). 
There are also a number of agencies with responsibilities in cyberspace imparted either 
by the president or Congress. Of note, the Department of Commerce (DOC) and Office 
for Management of the Budget (OMB) share responsibilities in executing the 
requirements of FISMA and the Department of State (DOS) holds responsibility for 
diplomatic efforts with foreign nations and intergovernmental organizations to lobby for 
adoption of norms for the use of cyberspace. 
The four fusion centers’ main goals appear to be the passing of information and 
the flattening of a complex and bureaucratic set of organizations. Toward the sharing of 
information with the private sector, the government approach since President Bush’s 
cyber strategy in 2003 has been incenting critical infrastructure industries to establish 
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Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs). Private industry now sponsors 24 
ISACs associated with industries both identified as critical and not, as well as a National 
Council (NCI) that facilitates information sharing between them as well as with the 
government (National Council of ISACs [NCI], n.d.). The U.S. organizations involved in 
cyber security and the information sharing structure for cybersecurity are summarized in 
Figure 4 and Figure 5, respectively. 
 
Figure 4.  Organizations Involved in U.S. Cybersecurity Approach. Adapted 





Figure 5.  Structure of U.S. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Paradigm 
In addition to the sharing of information, U.S. government organizations support 
the development of cybersecurity in the private sector through a multitude of programs. 
 NIST develops a significant amount of guidelines highlighting best 
practices in cybersecurity (Sedgewick, 2014). 
 DHS has jointly developed Enhanced Cybersecurity Services with three 
ISPs to offer improved protections to private entities on a voluntary basis 
(DHS, 2017b). 
 The National Security Agency (NSA), through its National Information 
Assurance Partnership (NIAP), supports security evaluation of commercial 
cybersecurity products (2017). 
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 DHS provides a long list of programs to improve cybersecurity training 
and awareness (2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017f). The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) also provides tips and resources for awareness (2017). 
 U.S. government organizations conduct a significant amount of research 
that benefits the private sector (National Security Agency [NSA], n.d.; 
DHS, 2017h, 2017i) 
C. OTHER NATION APPROACHES TO CYBERSECURITY 
1. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom (UK) places significant emphasis and priority on cyber 
defense (UK Cabinet Office, 2010). The UK National Security Council placed “Hostile 
attacks upon UK cyber space by other states and large scale cybercrimes” at the highest 
level of risks (UK Cabinet Office, 2010). 
a. Cyber security strategy 
The UK National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS) acknowledged the importance 
of engaging both academia and industry in the fight against cyber threats, and also laid 
out four objectives for the UK to achieve by 2015 (UK Cabinet Office, 2011): 
1. Secure cyberspace for business activities by tackling cybercrimes 
2. Improve protection and resilience against cyberattacks 
3. Establish safe, stable and vibrant cyberspace for the public to use in 
support of open societies 
4. Acquire and develop necessary cyber security knowledge, skills and 
capabilities to support cyber security objectives 
The strategy addresses the entire spectrum of Internet users including e 
government, large and small businesses, and individuals (UK Cabinet Office, 2011). The 
UK “set aside £650 million of public funding for a four-year, National Cyber Security 
Programme” (NCSP) to execute this strategy (UK Cabinet Office, 2011, p. 8). More than 
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half of the investment went into strengthening the UK’s ability to detect and defend 
against cyber threats, and the remainder was allocated to fighting cybercrimes and 
strengthening the critical infrastructure (UK Cabinet Office, 2011). 
Given that 80% of the UK’s critical national infrastructure was privately owned 
and the extensive use of cyberspace for private activities, the approach chosen by the 
government was to equip private firms and individuals with the required knowledge and 
information to adequately protect themselves in cyberspace (UK Cabinet Office, 2011). 
They established an operational partnership with private firms to exchange cyber threat 
information, encouraged industry-driven standards, and provided guidelines for cyber 
security products and cooperation with Internet Service Providers (ISPs) (UK Cabinet 
Office, 2011). Through its cooperation with ISPs, the UK drove to extend support to 
small businesses and individual users to protect them against cyber threats (UK Cabinet 
Office, 2011). 
The UK convened the London Conference on Cyberspace in November 2011 to 
pursue international rules and acceptable conduct in the use of the cyberspace (Hague, 
2011). The UK also worked closely with other countries to enforce cross-border laws as 
part of its fight against cybercrimes (UK Cabinet Office, 2011). 
The 2016 UK Cyber Security Strategy restated the majority of the threats 
identified in the earlier plan, but emphasized insider threats and the importance of cyber 
security training and threat awareness (UK Cabinet Office, 2016). The strategy also 
defined the responsibilities of the individuals in securing their own devices and systems, 
and that of the businesses in protecting the customers’ personal data and in providing 
products and services with the appropriate level of security built into them (UK Cabinet 
Office, 2016). 
The government planned to invest £1.9 billion over the next five years to 
accelerate the improvements to national cyber security (UK Cabinet Office, 2016). The 
initiatives included expanded intelligence and law enforcement on the cyber threat, 
investments and incentives to drive technology development and training, and the setting 
up of the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) as the central agency to execute the 
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strategy. It also planned to manage all national cyber security incidents and to support the 
other government departments and agencies on cyber security matters (UK Cabinet 
Office, 2016). 
b. Cyber security Organization 
Osula (2015) stated that it would be clearer to view the UK organizational 
structure for cyber security and cyber defense in three work streams: policy coordination 
and strategic priorities, national security and intelligence, and cyber defense. 
Policy coordination and strategic priorities: Within the Cabinet Office, the 
National Security Secretariat (NCS) is responsible for coordination on cyber security 
issues of strategic importance (National Security Secretariat [NCS], n.d.). The Office of 
Cyber Security & Information Assurance (OCSIA) within the NCS, coordinates the cyber 
security program, policies, and priorities across the government departments and agencies 
(Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance [OCSIA], n.d.). To accomplish its 
mission, OCSIA (n.d.): 
 Coordinates cyber security efforts with the Ministry of Defense (MOD), 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Home Office, the 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for 
Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) 
 Supports education and awareness through government programs and 
initiatives (e.g. GetSafe online information website) 
 Exchanges information and promotes best practices with private sector 
partners 
 Improves “UK’s information and cyber security technical capability and 
operational architecture” 
 “Works with the Office of the Government Senior Information Risk 
Owner (OGSIRO) to ensure the security of government 
[infocommunication technology (ICT)]” systems 
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 Collaborates with international partners to improve cyber and information 
security 
National security and intelligence: Under the National Cyber Security Programme 
(NCSP), GCHQ plays the leading role in the enhancement of UK’s capabilities in 
detecting and countering cyberattacks (UK Cabinet Office, 2011). Osula (2015) identified 
three entities in the GCHQ which play key roles in cyber security: 
1. The Cyber Defence Operations Team utilizes both overt and covert 
information sources (including sensitive capabilities within the GCHQ), to 
detect and analyze cyber threats and develop counter-measures. 
2. The Communications-Electronics Security Group (CESG) focuses on the 
technical aspects of defending the government computers and networks to 
develop guidelines and policy. 
3. The Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UK) provides 
warnings, alerts and assistance to public sector organizations in serious IT 
incidents. 
Under CERT-UK, the Cyber-security Information Sharing Partnership (CISP) 
establishes an online collaboration environment which partners with the private sector for 
effective cyber and risk management practices in real time (CISP, 2017). Osula (2015) 
asserts CISP was highly successful, with its community extending to 250 large firms and 
major organizations within a year. CISP was used as an integrating platform in 
government cyber security exercises, involving both the industrial partners and other 
government agencies, for testing cyber resiliency and responsiveness in the key sectors of 
the industry (Osula, 2015). 
The NCSC coordinates the efforts of the three GCHQ entities (National Cyber 
Security Centre [NCSC], 2017). The NCSC is the focal authority in charge of executing 
the 2016–2021 National Cyber Security Strategy (UK Cabinet Office, 2016). 
Military Cyber Defense: MOD (2016) efforts center on the ability to protect 
military networks and systems from rapidly evolving cyber threats (Ministry of Defence, 
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United Kingdom [MOD], 2016). While the MOD does not have a direct role in protecting 
private infrastructure (Osula, 2015), it partners with GCHQ through the National 
Offensive Cyber Program to collaborate on cyber tools, techniques and tradecraft (MOD, 
2016). The MOD also integrates a Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) with the 
NCSC. 
The MOD participates in UK efforts to promote cyber cooperation among nations 
(2016) via an agreement with the United States. 
2. Israel 
Israel is widely regarded as a world leader for scientific and technological 
innovations. Israel’s cyber security sales accounted for nearly 20% of the global private-
sector investment in that industry (Forbes, 2017b). 
a. Cyber security Strategy 
Israel does not have an official national cyber strategy, but began seeking a global 
leadership position in the field of cyber security through its 2010 “National Cyber 
Initiative” (Deborah, 2017; Prime Minister’s Office [PMO], 2017). A set of 
recommendations grew from the initiative, entitled “Advancing National Cyberspace 
Capabilities,” and led to the creation of the National Cyber Bureau (NCB) which was 
later joined by National Cyber Security Authority (NCSA), under the National Cyber 
Directorate (Ma’arach) (National Cybersecurity Bureau [NCB], 2015a).  
Siboni and Assaf (2016) indicated successes tied to the initiative but called for an 
official strategy to define national goals and where they fall in the government and the 
economy. Deborah (2017) indicated that the [unofficial] strategy anchored on four 
national priorities defined in Government Resolution 3611 (PMO, 2011): 
1. Advancing national cyber capabilities to meet current and future 
challenges 
2. Strengthening defense of national infrastructures 
3. Improving Israel’s global standing as a key player in ICT developments 
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4. Increasing cooperation between government, industry and academia on 
cyber security 
 Director General Eviatar Matania of Ma’arach described the country’s national cyber 
security strategy as having three layers (Forbes, 2017a):  
 Robustness: the government publishes policies and guidelines, but the 
individuals retain the responsibility to adhere to them. 
 Resilience: the government continues to play a major role in threat 
information sharing, analysis and preventive measures. 
 Defense: the government holds the exclusive responsibility to respond to 
major cyber incidents. 
Review of the literature reveals two notable examples of Israel’s approach to cyber 
security. 
Cooperation with Academia and the Private Sector:  Israel focuses on the cyber 
security cooperation between the government, the industry and the academia (Deborah, 
2017). Israel established the CyberSpark Innovative Initiative in 2014 to create an eco-
system for experts in the cyber security field to exchange ideas and foster innovation 
(CyberSpark, n.d.). Through the National Authority for Technological Innovation, the 
government has also invested in R&D programs, like the Meimad program which 
supported research work on dual-use cyber technologies (Deborah, 2017). Israel has 
geographically concentrated its cyber security talent and expertise at the Advanced 
Technologies Park in the southern Israeli city of Beersheba in proximity to Ben-Gurion 
University (Forbes, 2017a). 
Creation of a Digital Iron Dome: A notable part of Israel’s cyber security strategy 
is the development of a Digital Iron Dome. In October 2012, Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu announced that Israel would build a digital equivalent of the Iron Dome 
missile interceptor system to protect against daily cyberattacks (Hirsch & Gattegno, 
2012). At the CyberTech 2017 Conference in Tel Aviv, Director General Eviatar Matania 
of Ma’arach said that parts of the Digital Iron Dome, the Cyber Net, were already in 
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place and being piloted (Solomon, 2017). He explained that the Cyber Net connected the 
cyber security teams of public and private sectors, enhancing information sharing and 
cooperation (Solomon, 2017). 
b. Cyber security Organization 
Israeli Resolutions 2443 (Advancing National Regulation and Government 
Leadership in Cyber Security) and 2444 (Advancing the National Preparedness for Cyber 
Defense) directed the setting up of the National Cyber Directorate (Ma’arach), made up 
of the existing NCB and a new National Cyber Security Authority (National 
Cybersecurity Bureau [NCB], 2015b 2015c). 
The NCB oversees Israeli cyber security via the following responsibilities (PMO, 
2011): 
1. Develops national cyber policy, in partnership with industry and 
academia. 
2. Serves as the national regulatory body on cyber security, conducts national 
and international exercises on cyber incidents, and integrates national 
intelligence assets to advance awareness of cyber threats. 
3. Promotes research and development into cyber technologies and education 
and training to produce more cyber security professionals. 
NCSA conducts, operates and implements national level operational defensive 
efforts in civilian cyber space (NCB, 2015c). NCSA’s role includes handling of and 
responding to cyber threats and incidents, providing threat situation awareness, and 
coordinating with the defense community (NCB, 2015c). Under Government Resolution 
2444, NCSA’s responsibilities also include regulating and advising critical infrastructure 
sectors on cyber security (previously the domain of the National Information Security 
Agency) (NCB, 2015c). NCSA oversees the Israeli Cyber Event Readiness Team 
(CERT-IL), which performs intelligence sharing with trusted international and industry 




NCSA also has emergency responsibilities in the event of a national cyber 
security incident (Deborah, 2017). The National Emergency Management Authority 
(NEMA), within the Ministry of Defense, is overall in charge of organizing exercises 
together with the IDF Homefront Command, to simulate large scale disruptions to the 
critical infrastructure, including scenarios that involved cyberattacks (Deborah, 2017). 
Outside of the NCD, the Israel Police maintains a cyber division that specializes 
in digital forensics and evidence (Deborah, 2017). 
Military Cyber Defense: Herzog (2015) stated that Israel would continue to build 
up its cyber defense and offense capacity at the strategic, operative and tactical levels. 
Baram (2017) noted significant emphasis on the continued operation of national 
institutions in war and emergency situations as highlighted in the 2015 IDF Strategy. IDF 
is establishing the organizational structure and functions of its cyber command as part of 
the 2015 IDF Strategy (Deborah, 2017). 
3. Singapore 
Since the launch of the Smart Nation Initiative in November 2014, Singapore has 
been investing heavily in both the infocommunication technology (ICT) infrastructure 
and its accompanying technologies (Smart Nation, 2017). Kaspersky (2015) listed 
Singapore banking sector as the top target of financial malware, highlighting that 11.6% 
of Singapore users were targeted at least once by banking Trojans in 2015. 
a. Cyber security Strategy 
Cyber security is at the heart of the Smart Nation Initiative and the 2016 
Singapore Cyber Security Strategy defined four pillars that underpin the model that 
Singapore takes to combat the cyber threat (Cyber Security Agency of Singapore [CSA], 
2016): 
1. Strengthening the resilience of the critical information infrastructures (CII) 
2. Organizing businesses and the community to participate in protecting 
against cyber threats 
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3. Creating a cyber security community through investments in training, 
research and development and innovations 
4. Expanding international partnerships to combat cybercrimes, exchange 
cyber threat information and technologies 
The government is drafting a new Cybersecurity Act, which will establish a 
framework for the prevention and management of cyber incidents. This new legislation 
will complement the existing Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act (CMCA), which 
focuses on prosecution and justice for the cyber misdemeanors and the more serious 
organized cybercrimes (Attorney-General’s Chambers, 2007). The new Act also 
mandates that CII owners and operators be made responsible for the protection of their 
networks and systems (CSA, 2016). This new Act aims to give CSA greater access to 
information and more authority to work with organizations affected by cyber intrusions 
(CSA, 2016). 
In 2013, the National Research Foundation (NRF) launched the National 
Cybersecurity R&D Programme, which has S$190 million in funding till 2020, to support 
research into multiple cyber security fields (CSA, 2016). The government expends 
approximately 8% of its annual ICT expenditure toward cyber security (CSA, 2016). 
b. Cyber security Organization 
The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA) oversees all aspects of cyber 
security; including: national strategy and policy; cyber security operations; and 
engagement and education of industry and public on cyber security matters (CSA, 
2017a). CSA works closely with designated sector leads to protect Singapore’s critical 
infrastructure and services (CSA, 2017a). In the CII Protection Programme, the 
government provides guidelines to facilitate information exchange both within and 
between the sectors, assesses and conducts cyber security maturity assessments of the 
capabilities within the sectors, and encourages a culture of cyber threat awareness across 
the organizations (CSA, 2016). 
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CSA conducts annual whole-of-government cyber security exercises (Exercise 
Cyber Star), that puts all the national and sectorial cyber incident management plans to a 
series of complex scenarios (CSA, 2017b). In July 2017, the exercise was extended to 
cover all eleven critical sectors (Aviation, Banking & Finance, Energy, Government, 
Healthcare, Infocomm, Land Transport, Maritime, Media, Security & Emergency and 
Water) for the first time (CSA, 2017b). 
The Singapore Computer Emergency Response Team (SingCERT), under CSA, 
handles the detection, prevention and management of cyber security related incidents 
(CSA, 2017a). SingCERT provides threat alerts and advisories to the general public 
through its website and mailing list, and also conducts seminars and conferences for 
companies (CSA, 2017a). SingCERT works with other government agencies in the 
handling of cyber security related incidents, specifically in the critical sectors, such as 
banking, energy and water (CSA, 2017a). 
Within the CSA, the NCSC monitors and analyzes the cyber threat landscape, so 
as to provide situational awareness and provide early warning on any future threats (CSA, 
2016). NCSC coordinates national response to large-scale cyber incidents involving 
multiple critical sectors (CSA, 2016). 
Singapore organizes temporary National Cyber Incident Response Teams 
(NCIRT) to respond to incidents that “threaten national security” or target a critical 
industry sector (CSA, 2016, p. 17). The teams are designed to deal with complex attack 
scenarios and draw on resources from CSA, Government Technology (GovTech), and the 
Ministries of Home Affairs and Defense (MINDEF) (CSA, 2016). In the 2016 Singapore 
Cyber Security Strategy, there are plans to increase the number of NCIRT teams and to 
tap on the resources from the industry and academia (CSA, 2016). 
Military Cyber Defense: The Defense Cyber Organisation (SingDCO) leads 
Singapore’s military cyber defense arm (Ministry of Defence, Singapore [MINDEF], 
2017). It develops national cyber defense strategies and policies capabilities (MINDEF, 
2017). SingDCO is authorized to augment Singapore’s cyber security where deemed 
necessary by the CSA (MINDEF, 2017). Finally, the Cyber Defense Group, an arm of 
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SingDCO, operates a Cyber Defence Test and Evaluation Centre (CyTEC), which 
provides facilities for testing and evaluation of cyber defense tools, and also organizes 
training and exercises for cyber defense. 
D. METHODS FOR EVALUATING AND COMPARING POLICY OPTIONS 
Individuals, firms, and governments each face the tradeoffs associated with 
allocating scarce resources to challenges. The U.S. government, which has access to more 
wealth and natural resources than most, still faces scarcity due to the myriad of ways it 
can employ them. Consequently, government authorities may face complex choices 
without clear ordinal relationship. To distinguish between such choices, various methods 
have been developed and employed. This review summarizes a number of the general 
analytical methods employed by governments as well as cybersecurity-specific ones used 
by firms. 
1. Types of Goods and Externalities 
Before attempting to evaluate the tradeoffs of a policy option, government 
decision makers often need to qualify whether said option requires government 
intervention in the first place. Economists, over the last century, have sought to develop a 
theory or theories that answer this problem (Ostrom, 2003). One of the prevailing ideas to 
come from this area of study is the taxonomy of types of goods based on whether the 
good is exhaustible or rivalled and whether consumers could be prevented from 
consuming it (Ostrom, 2003). These delineations categorize all products or services as 
public (non-excludable and non-exhaustible/rivalled) goods, private (excludable and 
exhaustible/rivalled) goods, club (excludable but non-exhaustible/rivalled) goods, and 
common-pool resources (non-excludable but exhaustible/rivalled) (Ostrom, 2003). Goods 
in the non-excludable categories may exhibit externalities (costs and benefits not 
accounted for in their price) that create inefficiencies that cause markets to fail and, 
therefore, become candidates for government intervention (Graves, 2017).   
Another approach to determining the necessity for government intervention is 
through an analysis of market and non-market (read, government) failures (Wolf, 1979). 
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This approach includes assessing the type of good and potential externalities but 
identifies and describes the additional factors listed in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.  Market and Non-market Failures. Source: Wolf (1979). 
Wolf’s (1979) taxonomy of market failures include situations in which 
monopolies form or inherent aspects within the market prevent it from reaching an 
equilibrium or societally desired distribution. His taxonomy of non-market failures looks 
at reasons that governments should not intervene in a market (Wolf, 1979). These non-
market failures include situations where government budgets to an activity exceed the 
societal benefit and unanticipated impacts of intervention (Wolf, 1979). This analysis 
method involves a comparison of the market to non-market failures. Wolf (1979) 
indicates that governments have a case to intervene in markets where market failures 
exceed the sum of the cost of the government intervening as well as any potential non-
market failures. Zurb and McCurdy (1999) contend that market/non-market failure 
analysis is insufficient on its own to identify a need for government intervention without 
quantitative assessment of transaction costs. 
2. Comparative Policy Analysis 
Comparative Policy Analysis may be referred to as using a “cross-national 
perspective” toward assessing policy (Cyr & DeLeon, 1975, p. 1). Schmidt (2013, p. 111) 
defines Comparative Policy Analysis as “the systematic study and comparison of public 
policies and policy-making in different jurisdictions to better understand the factors and 
processes that underpin similarities and differences in policy choices.” Simply, it 
compares the choices of two or more distinct groups (states, countries) in order to inform 
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policy for one of the compared groups or another party (Vogel & Henstra, 2015). 
Comparative policy analysis can be either qualitative or quantitative but is generally 
positive in practice (Vogel & Henstra, 2015). 
3. Cost Benefit Analysis  
Much more quantitative than the previous analytical methods reviewed, a cost 
benefit analysis (CBA) attempts to reduce all possible costs and benefits associated with 
a policy option into one value in common terms that can be easily compared with all 
other policy options (Boardman, Greenberg, Vining, & Weimer, 2013). While this 
process is based off of a simple calculation (Net Benefits = Benefits – Costs), the process 
of converting all of the possible variables (e.g., time saved/lost, ease of use, lives 
saved/lost) into common terms (ideally, units of currency) can prove incredibly complex 
(Boardman et al., 2013). Analyses of policies spanning multiple years add the 
requirement for discounting future costs and benefits into present day value estimations 
(Boardman et al., 2013). At the federal level, such analyses must take into account the 
social impacts experienced by all its affected constituencies (Boardman et al., 2013). 
The agility of CBA to distill significantly different policy options in common 
terms that can be quantitatively compared is very valuable to government decision 
making. Users of CBA may not have adequate data to sufficiently reduce tradeoffs down 
to the level required, however. Alternative but related analysis methods have been 
developed to support these cases. Among these, two popular methods are cost 
effectiveness analysis (CEA) and multi-Criteria analysis (MCA) (Boardman et al., 2013; 
Dodgson, Spackman, Pearman, & Phillips, 2009). 
Each of the quantitative analysis methods (CBA, CEA, and MCA) require a 
relatively sound base of data to be able to produce reliable findings. In the case of a 
comparison of national level policies, each of these methods may require significant 
sources of data. A review of open sources revealed no authoritative source of the data 
necessary to pursue a quantitative cybersecurity policy comparison. 
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4. Cybersecurity Comparison Methods 
Firms have many varying approaches to determining their desired level of 
cybersecurity investment and, subsequently, cybersecurity. Among the published models 
sampled, two themes seem to be prevalent. 
The first is that firms must estimate how much future cyber incidents will impact 
them given their current level of cyber security. Most models use a variation of annual 
loss expectancy (ALE), a function of the frequency and monetized harm of a type of 
cyber incident, to determine this impact (Hoo, 2000; Bojanc & Jerman-Blažič, 2008). 
There is variation in the ways the input to this function are derived (Hoo, 2000; Bojanc & 
Jerman-Blažič, 2008; Mukhopadhyay, Chatterjee, Saha, Mahanti, & Sadhukhan, 2013) as 
well as in the ways the output of the function are used (Hoo, 2000). 
The second theme is in the courses firms may take to approach cybersecurity risk. 
The actions that firms may take to address a specific cyber threat group are: accepting the 
risk/loss, mitigating the risk through investment in cybersecurity, transferring the risk 
through the purchase of insurance, or avoiding the risk by disposing of vulnerable assets 
(Bojanc & Jerman-Blažič, 2008). 
The author’s comprehensive search of open sources revealed no example of a 
cybersecurity analysis model being applied at the nation-state level. 
5. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework was developed in response to Executive 
Order 13636 (EO) on “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity” dated February 
12, 2013. The framework is based on a set of proven standards, guidelines and practices 
pulled from a wide array of sources, including international standards organizations 
(Sedgewick, 2014). Since the publication of the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, 
it has developed in collaboration with private industry and is offered for adoption by the 
same (with a specific focus audience of CII) (S.1353, 2014). The framework categorizes 
cybersecurity practices and sub-functions to allow organizations to easily adopt their use 
toward specific foci (Sedgewick, 2014). This same categorization facilitates either 
normative or positive, comparative analysis. 
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E. SIMILAR RESEARCH 
A review of the literature indicates that many studies have employed some form 
of comparative analysis of cybersecurity policies. Of those, three were specifically 
reviewed during this study and require special mention. Daniel Benoliel (2014) compared 
the policies of five nations to derive the elements necessary to create a national 
cybersecurity policy model for the purpose of developing Israel’s strategy. The Cyber 
Readiness Index performs a detailed review of 125 countries to find evidence of seven 
indicators of cyber readiness (Hathaway, Demchak, Kerben, McArdle, & Spidalieri, 
2015). They assign scores based on their assessments and follow with a derived 
quantitative comparison of the sampled nations (Hathaway et al., 2015). Finally, a group 
from the International Monetary Fund is conducting a detailed market failure analysis of 
the financial sector to identify its impacts on the industry (Kopp, Kaffenberger, & 
Wilson, 2017). 
F. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviews the literature to ascertain the approach to cybersecurity 
undertaken by the four countries included in this study. The research indicates that United 
States is more liberal in its approach, choosing to champion international cooperation and 
encourage private sector adoption of cybersecurity standards. Research indicates the UK 
selects a deterrent approach, investing heavily to build up its detection and retaliation 
capabilities, positioning herself as a daunting target for would-be cyber attackers. 
Strategy documents infer that Israel focuses on protection as it builds a “protective 
shield” over its entire cyber infrastructure. As a key financial and transportation hub in 
Asia, Singapore appears to take a focus on cyber security resiliency, concentrating on 
how cyber incidents are managed and how to quickly recover from them.  
This chapter also reviews a number of possible methods for comparing 
cybersecurity policy options to identify possible approaches for normative and positive 
analysis. Research indicates that a quantitative approach is preferred but requires data 
that is not readily available in open source and unclassified repositories. Subsequently, a 
qualitative analysis may provide more reliable results. 
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In Chapter I, the authors introduced the growing threat existing in cyberspace and 
the problem determining if the U.S. government response is sufficient in addressing the 
threat. In Chapter II, the authors reviewed the existing, open source literature to: 
introduce the concept of cybersecurity, identify the current approaches of four national 
governments (the United States, the UK, Israel, and Singapore) to affect cybersecurity, 
and review potential methods for comparing cybersecurity policy options. 
This chapter outlines the methods for: normatively determining whether there is a 
role for government intervention, positively comparing actions taken by the three foreign 
governments against those of the United States in order to identify a possible menu of 
policy options for consideration, and qualitatively conducting an analysis of alternative, 
incremental policy options. 
A. COMPARATIVE POLICY ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 
In this work the authors seek to answer the following questions: 
1. What is the United States doing to protect private entities in cyberspace? 
2. What other measures could the United States adopt to protect private 
entities in cyberspace? 
3. How can decision makers compare the tradeoffs of cybersecurity policy 
options at the national level? 
To answer to these research questions, a framework for comparing and analyzing 
the information discovered in literature must be developed. The authors built this 
proposed framework with the following considerations in mind: 
1. Provide ease of use. This research is primarily targeted at government 
managers and decision makers with a basic understanding of public policy 
and cybersecurity but envision a framework that could be used by a broad 
audience. Hence, the use of overly technical jargon was avoided or 
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sufficient explanation was provided if the use of such technical terms was 
unavoidable. 
2. Categorically compare policies against desired outcomes. The 
governments sampled execute a wide range of measures to protect private 
entities in the cyberspace. Both the amount of evidence as well as 
differences in terminology for similar actions limit the value provided by a 
direct comparison of individual measures. To address this, the authors, 
organized the many, disparate policy measures against the desired 
outcomes of an effective cybersecurity policy. 
3. Use existing/familiar tools to frame the comparison as much as possible. 
To facilitate ease of use and a common set of definitions, the authors make 
use of existing cybersecurity frameworks as much as practicable. 
To meet these goals, the authors set out to use the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework (Sedgewick, 2014) to group and organize the research. The CSF uses the top-
level core functions of Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recovery to group and 
simplify the definitions of the myriad of guidelines an organization should follow to 
holistically provide for its cybersecurity (Sedgewick, 2014). Each of the CSF core 
functions is subdivided into categories and sub-categories to facilitate incremental 
changes to an organization’s cybersecurity policy (Sedgewick, 2014). The CSF functions 
are (Sedgewick, 2014): 
Identify: The objective of the “Identify” function is to develop the individuals’ 
and organizations’ understanding of their assets and information in order to manage 
cybersecurity risk. 
Protect: The objective of the “Protect” function is to develop and implement the 
relevant policies, measures and safeguards to ensure the protection of assets and 
information from cyberattacks. The “Protect” function also supports the ability to limit or 
contain the impact of a potential cyberattack. 
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Detect: The objective of the “Detect” function is to develop and implement the 
relevant procedures and capabilities to detect and discover the occurrence of a 
cyberattack in a timely manner. 
Respond: The objective of the “Respond” function is to develop and implement 
the relevant procedures and capabilities to answer to a detected cyberattack. Like the 
“Protect” function, the “Respond” function also supports the ability to limit or contain the 
impact of a potential cyberattack through mitigation measures like segregating the 
affected assets and neutralizing of the attacking source. 
Recover: The objective of the “Recover” function is to develop and implement the 
relevant plans, procedures and capabilities to improve the resiliency and to restore the 
assets, information and functions affected by a cyberattack in a timely manner. 
The authors subsequently discovered that use of the subdivisions of the CSF did 
not optimally organize the evidence. The CSF was developed with the perspective of an 
organization or individual in mind. It identifies a menu of options the entity can pursue to 
improve its cybersecurity to address aspects internal to itself and external from the 
environment it sits within. Applying the NIST CSF from the perspective of a government 
introduces complexity not incorporated in the design. (Representative) Democratic 
governments are not homogenous and consist of many entities that vary in scope, scale, 
and aspect. All of these aspects interplay and affect cybersecurity at varying levels. The 
CSF functions do not account for ways a government can intervene to change the overall 
cybersecurity landscape; specifically, the diplomatic, informational, military, and 
economic manifestations of government power. Practically, the authors also found that 
many government policy measures spanned multiple CSF categories in ways that did not 





Figure 7.  Cybersecurity Perspectives of Private and Public Entities 
To address these issues, the authors propose nine outcome-based categories as 
subdivisions for the CSF when used to compare government policies. The descriptions of 










of Assets and 
Information 
The organization understands its business context, its resources and assets 
supporting its key functions, and also its policies and procedures 
governing the use of these resources and assets. Individuals understand 
their personal devices and data (e.g. Facebook profile, online blogs). 
Risk 
Management  
Private Entities understand how to and have assessed their cybersecurity 
risk based on threats, vulnerabilities, and security controls. Private 
Entities use their understanding to focus and prioritize resources and 
efforts toward managing the cybersecurity risks and ensuring business 
continuity. Individuals make informed choices based on the cybersecurity 
risks that they face as a user of the Internet. 
PROTECT Management of 
Assets and 
Information 
Private Entities implement measures (e.g., security clearance, identity 
management) and safeguards (e.g., firewalls, encryption) to control 
access to both physical and logical assets, information and also plants and 
facilities. They implement security policies and procedures governing the 
protection of information and data, ensuring the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability. Individuals take measures to protect their identity, data, 
and systems in cyberspace. 




Private Entities have sufficient education, training, and awareness to be 
cognizant of cyber threats, security policies and best practices and 
subsequently reduce the risk of cyber incidents and unintended data 
losses due to ignorance or negligence. Individuals have the necessary 
knowledge and awareness to protect themselves from cybercrimes and 
other forms of cyber intrusions. Enough education exists to support the 
growing need for cybersecurity professionals in both the public and 
private sectors. 




The extent of expertise and talent in the cybersecurity field grows with 
velocity greater than the development of cyber threats. Sufficient research 
and development is conducted to effectively secure Private Entities in 
cyberspace. 




Private Entities are able to monitor the status and health of their 
information systems and assets, can detect and investigate any abnormal 
or suspicious ongoing activities in a timely manner, and obtain early 
warning of impending suspicious activity where possible. For individuals, 
this may involve picking up on indicators (e.g., high data usage on mobile 
devices) on his devices, detecting suspicious activity on his online 
accounts (e.g., email accounting sending spam to friends), or being 





Private Entities develop and test cyber incident response plans to prepare 
for cyber incidents. During incidents, Private Entities execute plans to 
contain incidents in a timely and efficient manner and communicate with 
external partners (law enforcement agencies, information sharing 
partners) to limit the overall effectiveness of the incident. Individuals 
know the basic steps to take when the victim of cyber incident and 
understand how and to what agencies to report. 
RECOVER Recovery from 
Cyber Incidents  
In the aftermath of a cyberattack, Private Entities have the capabilities 
necessary to recover operations, assets, and data to an acceptable, pre-
incident state.  




This function recognizes Government functions that may not cleanly fall 
in any of the NIST functions, yet may impact the cybersecurity of Private 




B. EXPANDING THE FRAMEWORK TO FACILITATE NORMATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
Chapter II introduced and summarized a number of methods in the literature for 
qualitatively assessing whether a good/service necessitates government intervention. 
Using a combination of Type of Good analysis and Market/Non-Market Failure analysis, 
the authors propose the following questions as a method for qualitatively determining 
whether each of the desired outcomes in cybersecurity necessitates government action: 
1. Is there a problem in the existing market/environment that inhibits the 
government’s ability to reach a desired cybersecurity outcome? 
2. Is it likely the market/environment will resolve the existing problem 
without government intervention? 
By answering these questions, the authors assess whether the governments should 
have a role in creating the desired cybersecurity options. For negative answers, 
discontinuing the government policy in question may be recommended. For affirmative 
answers, the authors can continue to positive comparisons of different governments. The 





Figure 8.  Comparison Framework with Normative Analysis 
C. POSITIVE ANALYSIS—IDENTIFYING THE MENU OF OPTIONS 
By organizing information from the literature review into the proposed 
framework, the authors facilitate a categorical comparison of each government’s 
cybersecurity-related actions. This allows the identification of categories in which one or 
more of the foreign governments has implemented policy that the United States has not. 
These policies are then compared against the desired outcome of the category to 
determine if they could be an improvement over the United States’ current 
implementation. 
The authors further reduce the aggregate actions of each government into a label 
for the type of intervention the governments undertake. The labels are defined as follows: 
 Promote & Support—The government undertakes a series of initiatives 
and programs to advocate or incentivize the adoption of norms or action. 
For example, the government provides information about the cyber threat 
landscape to support the risk assessment study conducted by the 
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organization. The government provides resources but does not provide the 
entirety of the good/service. 
 Regulate—The government requires adoption of norms or practice 
through legislation. For example, governments may require entities to 
adopt cybersecurity standards and stand up the agencies necessary to 
enforce those standards. 
 Provide—The government directly pays for or provides goods and/or 
services in their entirety. 
Labelling each government’s actions in a specific category allows a quick 
comparison to determine differences in the intervention approach. The authors assess 
those differences to find categories where a change in the United States’ approach to 






Figure 9.  Comparison Framework with Normative and Positive Analysis 
This framework allows comparison of positive differences in policies of differing 
governments. Although the focus of this research was on four select governments, the 
analysis could be expanded to include different governments or altered to focus on tiers 
of government in federal (or similar) systems. It could also be applied to compare a 
specific government against a proposed set of standards, regulations, or guidelines. 
The framework additionally facilitates comparison of the governments’ positive 
actions against the normative assessment of the necessity of government action proposed 
in section B of this chapter. What the framework does not support is determining whether 
a specific policy option or type of approach is sufficient for reaching the desired 
outcome. To address this shortfall, the authors introduce an analysis of alternatives. 
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D. ANALYSIS OF CYBERSECURITY POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
To assess the sufficiency of a specific policy option or type of approach against a 
desired outcome for cybersecurity, the following questions must be answered: 
1. What potential, incremental policy options could the government 
undertake to address the problem? 
2. What would it take for the government to undertake any of the potential 
policy options? 
3. Which option likely provides the best outcome? 
To simplify the enumeration of alternatives, the authors take an incremental 
policy approach utilizing the labels for a government’s aggregate approach (Promote & 
Support, Regulate, and Provide). For instance, the alternatives for a category the United 
States promotes and supports private entities would be as following: 
1. Maintain the Status Quo 
2. Expand (or reduce) Promote and Support 
3. Regulate 
4. Provide 
The authors qualitatively apply the results of our literature review to expound 
upon the nature of these alternatives and their associated costs and tradeoffs in order to 
make a recommendation on the sufficiency of government intervention in each outcome-




Figure 10.  Comparison Framework with Analysis of Alternatives. 
The resultant framework allows a categorization and comparison of current 
government policies as well as facilitates both a normative and positive analysis of 
cybersecurity options. The normative analysis supports the determination of necessity for 
government intervention. The positive analysis supports the identification of potential 
policy options and approaches. Finally, the analysis of alternatives begins to address a 
level of optimality in the type of intervention. 
E. CONCLUSION 
In Chapter I, the authors introduced the difficulty involved with determining 
whether the United States is doing enough for Private Entities in cybersecurity and the 
research questions to answer that information gap. In Chapter II, the current literature on 
the cybersecurity approaches of four governments and methods for comparing and 
analyzing policy options were reviewed. In this chapter, the authors use the findings of 
the literature review to design a framework for both a normative and positive analysis of 
cybersecurity policy options. 
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In the following chapters, the authors apply the framework to the findings of the 
literature review to assess the necessity and sufficiency of government intervention for 





In Chapter I, the authors introduced the growing threat existing in cyberspace and 
the problem determining if the U.S. government response is sufficient in addressing the 
threat. In Chapter II, the existing, open source literature was reviewed to: introduce the 
concept of cybersecurity, identify the current approaches of the United States, the UK, 
Israel, and Singapore to affect cybersecurity, and review potential methods for comparing 
cybersecurity policy options. In Chapter III, the authors used the findings of the literature 
review to design a framework for both a normative and positive analysis of cybersecurity 
policy options. 
In this chapter, the authors apply the framework defined in Chapter III to the 
information gleaned from the literature review to: 
1. Build an argument for the necessity of government intervention in eight of 
nine cybersecurity outcome-based categories 
2. Identify and analyze the positive actions of four national governments to 
proffer a potential menu of cybersecurity policy options for consideration 
3. Conduct an analysis of options to recommend the appropriate level of 
government intervention in each category 
A. ANALYSIS OF THE OUTCOME-BASED CATEGORIES 
For each of the outcome-based categories defined in Chapter III, the authors will 
use the following questions as a guide toward qualitatively determining whether each of 
the desired outcomes in cybersecurity necessitates government action: 
1. Is there a problem in the existing market/environment that inhibits the 
government’s ability to reach a desired cybersecurity outcome? 
2. Is it likely the market/environment will resolve the existing problem 
without government intervention? 
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There would be a comparison of information pulled from the literature review 
(Chapter II) to positively answer: 
3. What are the governments doing to protect private entities in cyberspace? 
4. How would the government’s aggregate approach to cybersecurity in a 
category (Promote & Support, Regulate, and Provide) be labelled? 
5. What actions and approaches of foreign governments could the United 
States consider for implementation? 
Finally, the authors will build an incremental analysis of alternatives using the 
following questions to recommend the appropriate level for U.S. government 
intervention: 
6. What potential, incremental policy options could the government 
undertake to address the problem? 
7. What would it take for the government to undertake any of the potential 
policy options? 
8. Which option likely provides the best outcome? 
1. Identify: Understanding of Assets and Information 
a. Definition 
The organization understands its business context, its resources and assets 
supporting its key functions, and also its policies and procedures governing the use of 
these resources and assets. Individuals understand their personal devices and data (e.g. 
Facebook profile, online blogs). 
b. Type of Good Analysis 
Understanding may be considered a club good. Understanding of assets and 
information is excludable but non-rivalled. Governments exclude entities from 
information gathered in intelligence streams through classification; firms and individuals 
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through proprietary information controls. Providing understanding to a new entity does 
not reduce understanding held by others. 
c. Possible Market Failures 
A good understanding of an organization’s assets and information is an important 
cornerstone toward the protection of its cyber resources. An organization failing to 
clearly define the “defensive” perimeter for its connected networks and systems 
infrastructure, may come up with erroneous cybersecurity plans, leading to security gaps 
and ineffective cybersecurity implementation. This poses a danger not only to the 
organization, but also its connected partners and customers. 
However, it is not easy to quantify the benefits activities such as asset 
management contribute to cybersecurity, and as a result this category is frequently under-
invested. Understanding can be classified as a merit good as it is frequently under-
provided or under-consumed despite the positive externalities attached to it (Economics 
Online, 2017). Given the limited resources for the small firms and individuals, the 
likelihood of overlooking the investments into this category would be even higher, as 
priority would be given to investing for business outcomes or personal consumption. 
d. Potential for Market Self Correction 
With lower upfront cost and improved flexibility provided by Software-as-a-
Service (SaaS) asset management tools, private organizations that were previously 
concerned with the huge investments in time and money, may now be more motivated to 
look into improving their understanding of assets and information enabled by these 
technologies. In the same vein, the availability of cheap or even free software (e.g. 
SysAid, SpiceWorks and GLPI) to help the individuals track and manage devices and 
data would also likely bring about a positive change. 
Despite improvements in technology which increase the availability and 
affordability of asset management, however, many private entities lack maturity or 
awareness in cybersecurity (Homeland Security Committee [HSC], 2017). Additionally, 
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private entities in none of the countries sampled have the legal authority to conduct the 
intelligence gathering operations of sovereign states. 
e. Positive Analysis 
The current level of U.S. government intervention can be classified as promotion 
and support. The U.S. government advocates for the use of standards and frameworks to 
improve understanding of assets, but adoption is left to the private entities (Sedgewick, 
2014; DHS, 2013). This is similar for the UK and Israeli governments, which also took 
on the responsibilities of directly advising the firms providing CII (NCSC, 2017; NCB, 
2015c). 
Singapore stands out with a different approach, mandating private firms providing 
CII to adopt a framework for assessing its governance maturity and network 
cybersecurity maturity, and holding these firms liable in securing their own systems 
(CSA, 2016). 
f. Analysis of Alternatives 
The authors conducted an analysis of alternatives on prospective, incremental 




Figure 11.  Analysis of Understanding of Assets and Information 
The authors proposed and compared four alternatives for incremental policy 
consideration. In the absence of quantifiable data, a mathematically superior alternative 
for this and all following outcome-based categories could not be declared. The qualitative 
analysis did, however, provide information on the likely trade-offs between the 
alternatives and may be used to indicate superior options. 
In the case of Understanding, the authors found that either regulation or complete 
provision by the government introduces significant trade-offs. It was conjectured that 
Singapore’s pursuit of an intervention approach of regulation would not work in the 
context of the United States, primarily given the difference in the size of the governed. 
Additionally, Singapore’s government structure and history makes regulation a more 
attractive choice. Since the 1960s, the Singaporean government exerted partial ownership 
of hundreds of firms to develop its economy and maintains significant influence in the 
private sector (Ramirez & Tan, 2004). 
Between the expansion of promotion and support and remaining at the status quo, 
the authors proposed that expansion would provide benefits that exceed the likely costs. 
Understanding of assets and information is arguably the cornerstone of all cybersecurity. 
Function Outcome-Based Categories Potential Intervention (Policy Options) Intervention Costs
A) Status Quo (no change) A) Status Quo (no change)
1. Accept the limitations posed by disparate 
understanding of assets and information by private 
firms.
B) Expand Promote and Support - Increase the 
advocacy for the use of standards and frameworks to 
improve understanding of assets.
B) Expand Promote and Support
1. Increase funding for agencies to promote the use 
of standards and frameworks to improve 
understanding of assets and information.  Budget 
tradeoffs with other priorities or increased taxation.
Current US Intervention Level
Promote & Support
Key Differences
Singapore: Regulates/requires firms to conduct 
this function in accordance with their provided 
framework.
IDENTIFY (ID)
C) Regulate - Require private entities to perform 
asset management and related activities, in order to 
accomplish the objective of improving private 
entities' understanding of their assets and 
information.
C) Regulate
1. Funding and political capital for legislation.
2. Funding to create/expand agency for enforcment.  
Includes increase funding for cybersecurity 
expertise on staff/contract.
3. Privacy impacts of auditing private firms.
4. Potential lawsuits.
5. Budget tradeoffs with other priorities or 
increased taxation. 
Understanding of assets and information:  The 
organization understands its business context, its 
resources and assets supporting its key functions, 
and also its policies and procedures governing the 
use of these resources and assets.  Individuals 
understand their personal devices and data (e.g. 
Facebook profile, online blogs).
D) Provide - Provide services to perform asset and 
data management for the private entities.
D) Provide
1. Increase in funding for providing this service. 
2. Increase funding for cybersecurity expertise on 
staff/contract.
3. Budget tradeoffs with other priorities or 
increased taxation.
4. Potential blindsides for industry-specific risk 




A failure to accurately account for an entity’s purpose and assets may compound the 
challenge of all other cybersecurity functions and may negatively impact the surrounding 
cybersecurity ecosystem. Recent legislation indicated intent to expand via the inclusion 
of private industry in the NIST standards and expanded research (S.1353, 2014). 
Additional subsidization efforts, such as the institution of tax incentives for businesses 
with demonstrable asset and risk management artifacts may accelerate progress toward 
the desired outcome with significantly less trade off. 
2. Identify: Risk Management 
a. Definition 
Private Entities understand how to and have assessed their cybersecurity risk 
based on threats, vulnerabilities, and security controls. Private Entities use their 
understanding to focus and prioritize resources and efforts toward managing the 
cybersecurity risks and ensuring business continuity. Individuals make informed choices 
based on the cybersecurity risks that they face as a user of the Internet. 
b. Type of Good Analysis 
Risk management is an inherently private good. Entities can exclude others from 
both risk assessment and management by either omission or commission. Further, 
because risk management requires time, training, personnel, and tools the ability to 
provision risk management at a set budget decreases as the scale is increased. 
c. Possible Market Failures 
The need to perform risk management is understood by both the government and 
the private sector. Organizations carry out risk assessments in varying degrees of span 
and depth, depending on their perceived risk profiles, business models, and designated 
budgets. Risk management is inherently a private good, as it is both excludable and 




Risk assessments conducted by organizations are, logically, internally focused. 
Organizations emphasize the internal and external risks to their business and potentially 
neglect the risks their choices impose on others. Subsequent risk management strategies 
may therefore impose externalities on others that are not rectified by market forces. 
d. Potential for Market Self Correction 
Individuals and organizations are recognizing the need to be more responsible 
“netizens” (active Internet users) (Hauden, 1996). In order to portray a “responsible” 
image, organizations may take additional steps to avoid imposing cyber risks on others. 
Subsequently, they may voluntarily increase the scope of their risk assessments to include 
their effect on the environment. An example of how such activity might be realized in 
practice as organizations filtering out “spoofed” traffic originating from their networks 
(Internet Engineering Task Force [IETF], 2000). 
However, this trend does not fully address market failures and leaves a role for 
government intervention. Private entities lack the authority for intelligence collection to 
develop a complete picture of the threats facing themselves (Executive Order No. 12333, 
1981). Smaller and less mature entities may be unable to internally conduct risk 
management to a desired level or understand how to outsource the function sans a 
recognized set of best practices (Bodeau & Graubart, 2017). 
e. Positive Analysis 
The current level of U.S. government intervention can be classified as promotion 
and support through the sharing of information with the private entities (S.754, 2015; 
NCI, n.d.). Through the sharing of both overt and covert information, the U.S. 
government raises the level of risk assessment by the private entities, allowing these 
private entities to understand the threats better and make more informed risk management 
decisions (S.754, 2015; NCI, n.d.). The other governments researched in this paper 
approach cybersecurity of private entities at a comparable level (CISP, 2017; Deborah, 
2017; CSA, 2016). 
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f. Analysis of Alternatives 
The authors conducted an analysis of alternatives on prospective, incremental 
policies (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12.  Analysis of Risk Management 
In the case of Risk Management, either regulation or complete provision by the 
government introduces significant trade-offs. Costs to implement measures of compliance 
for either would be extreme (Kopp et al., 2017). The added privacy impact of government 
access to the information necessary to conduct risk management as well as the political 
capital expenditure necessary to pass the requisite legislation necessary for these changes 
in policy sum to greatly exceed the potential benefits. 
While it is clear that there would be benefits to expanding the nation’s 
cybersecurity intelligence gathering capabilities or providing subsidies to increase 
participation in good risk management programs, it is unclear whether those benefits 
outweigh the costs of the expansion without a quantifiable cost benefit analysis. There is 
evidence to indicate that government agencies can improve the context and timeliness of 
Function Outcome-Based Categories Potential Intervention (Policy Options) Intervention Costs
A) Status Quo (no change) A) Status Quo (no change)
1. Accept the limitations posed by risk assessments 
conducted by private firms.
B) Expand Promote and Support - Increase funding 
for cybersecurity collection and analysis in support 
of private entities.  Provide additional incentives to 
improve participation in and conduct of risk 
management by private entities.
B) Expand Promote and Support
1. Increase funding for cybersecurity collection and 
analysis in support of private entities. Budget 
tradeoffs with other priorities or increased taxation. 
2. Funding for subsidies or reduced tax revenues. 





Risk Management: Private Entities understand 
how to and have assessed their cybersecurity risk 
based on threats, vulnerabilities, and security 
controls.  Private Entities use their understanding to 
focus and prioritize resources and efforts towards 
managing the cybersecurity risks and ensuring 
business continuity.  Individuals make informed 
choices based on the cybersecurity risks that they 
face as a user of the Internet.
C) Regulate - Require private entities to perform 
risk assessment based on a standardized template 
which ensures that risks posed by organization to 
external users are taken into consideration.
C) Regulate
1. Funding and political capital for legislation.
2. Funding to create/expand agency for enforcment.  
Includes increase funding for cybersecurity 
expertise on staff/contract.
3. Privacy impacts of auditing private firms.
4. Potential lawsuits.
5. Budget tradeoffs with other priorities or 
increased taxation. 
D) Provide - Directly fund all risk assessment 
activities for the private organizations.
D) Provide
1. Increase in funding for providing this service. 
2. Increase funding for cybersecurity expertise on 
staff/contract.
3. Budget tradeoffs with other priorities or 
increased taxation.
4. Potential blindsides for industry-specific risk 




information shared with the private sector (HSC, 2017) but these changes should not 
require a fundamental change in the U.S. approach to cybersecurity. 
3. Protect: Management of Assets and Information 
a. Definition 
Private Entities implement measures (e.g., security clearance, identity 
management) and safeguards (e.g., firewalls, encryption) to control access to both 
physical and logical assets, information and also plants and facilities. They implement 
security policies and procedures governing the protection of information and data, 
ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and availability. Individuals take measures to 
protect their identity, data, and systems in cyberspace. 
b. Type of Good Analysis 
Portions of Management of Assets and Information appear to be club goods, 
including development of policies and practices. These scale well indicating that they are 
non-rivalled. Entities may exclude others from the benefits of these policies and practices 
by proprietary controls. 
Most of Management of Assets and Information more closely model private 
goods. Entities may exclude others from Management of Assets and Information by 
either omission or commission. Furthermore, because management requires time, 
training, personnel, and tools the ability to provision it at a set budget decreases as the 
scale is increased. 
c. Possible Market Failures 
For the private firm, the implementation of security measures to protect 
information and physical assets is usually weighed against usability and cost. The 
effectiveness of the implemented measures may be further limited by the degree to which 
private entities do (or do not) understand the risks to themselves and others in cyberspace 
(reference Sections 2 and 3 of this chapter). For the individual, usability and cost 
considerations usually outweigh security in most purchase and usage decisions due to 
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information failure, resulting in a heightened vulnerability to cyber incident (Kopp et al., 
2017). 
d. Potential for Market Self Correction 
A rising awareness of cyber threats and the potential repercussions has led to a 
rise in the adoption of protective technologies (Muresan, 2017). Gartner reported that 
cybersecurity investment is expected to grow another 7.6% to $90 billion in 2017 and 
would hit $113 billion by 2020 (Muresan, 2017). 
Despite rising investment, pursuit of protective capabilities often lags behind 
threats due to a penchant for cyber threat actors to find and exploit new/previously 
unknown vulnerabilities. This indicates that market self-correction will not occur at a 
socially optimal rate. Further, many governments have acknowledged that incidents to 
specific industries may have wide and great impact on the security and stability of their 
states. Finally, while there may be some economies of scale in outsourcing to 
cybersecurity firms, the ability to realize these without a trusted source of best practices 
may be limited. As such, there remains a role for government intervention. 
e. Positive Analysis 
The level of U.S. government intervention can be categorized as promote and 
support with a few notable exceptions: 
 Commercial firms must use government guidelines for hosting 
information the nation has classified (HSC, 2017) 
 The U.S. Defense Production Act empowers the President to set priorities 
for private industry under specific conditions (Fischer, 2013) 
The NIST cybersecurity guidelines form a key part of the U.S. government’s 
strategy to promote the best practices of management of assets and information for 
private entities (S.1353, 2014; Sedgewick, 2014). The U.S. government partners with 
three ISPs to offer Enhanced Cybersecurity Services to private entities on a voluntary 
basis (DHS, 2017b). 
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Two of the governments compared in the analysis indicated differing levels of 
intervention. The Israeli government stated its intent to stand up an agency to inspect and 
approve cyber security products in the market (NCB, 2015b). While this service is similar 
in type to one the NSA offers (National Information Assurance Partnership [NIAP], n.d.), 
the Israeli study indicates they intend to provide this service to all Israeli cybersecurity 
products. The Singaporean government is drafting regulation to mandate the 
implementation of a set of security measures by ISPs (CSA, 2016). 
f. Analysis of Alternatives 
The authors conducted an analysis of alternatives on prospective, incremental 
policies (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13.  Analysis of Management of Assets and Information. 
Function Outcome-Based Categories Potential Intervention (Policy Options) Intervention Costs
A) Status Quo (no change) A) 
1. Accept the limitations posed by inconsistent 
protection implemented by private firms.
B) Expand Promote and Support B) 
1. Increase funding for promoting the adopting NIST 
cybersecurity best practises. Budget tradeoffs with 
other priorities or increased taxation. 
2. Increase collaboration with ISPs to provide 
protective services for private entities.
Current US Intervention Level
Promote & Support
Key Differences
The Israeli gov't planned to set up an agency that 
would inspect and approve cyber security products 
in the market.  This is similar to the service that the 
NSA is currently offering in certifying products 
used for storing, transmitting and processing high 
classification data.
Singaporean gov't recognizes the important role 
played by the ISPs in the protection aspect of 
cybersecurity, mandating the implementation of 




Management of Assets and Information: Private 
Entities implement measures (e.g. security 
clearance, identity management) and safeguards 
(e.g. firewalls, encryption) to control access to both 
physical and logical assets, information and also 
plants and facilities.  They implement security 
policies and procedures governing the protection of 
information and data, ensuring the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability.  Individuals take measures 
to protect their identity, data, and systems in 
cyberspace.
C) Regulate.  Provide legislation that mandates the 
levels of asset and information protection required 
for organizations in different sectors.  Alternatively, 
to regulate the level of cybersecurity products and 
services offered in the market, so as to ensure a 
certain level of standard for the end consumers.
C) 
1. Funding and political capital for legislation.
2. Funding to create/expand agency for enforcment.  
Includes increase funding for cybersecurity 
expertise on staff/contract.
3. Privacy impacts of auditing private firms.
4. Potential lawsuits.
5. Budget tradeoffs with other priorities or 
increased taxation. 
D) Provide.  Use technical means to protect the 
private entities by filtering at national gateways and 
switches.
D) 
1. Increase in funding for providing this service. 
2. Increase funding for cybersecurity expertise on 
staff/contract.
3. Budget tradeoffs with other priorities or 
increased taxation.




In the case of Management of Assets and Information, neither regulation nor 
complete provision indicates a net benefit over the status quo. Providing protection to all 
private entities via instantiation of a national gateway faces numerous social and 
technical challenges. The use of encryption and the sheer amount of data crossing the 
physical network boundaries between nations severely limits the effectiveness of a 
national filter. Filters focused on physical boundaries would also fail to parse any 
internally initiated threats. If provision was technically cost effective, the privacy impacts 
would be exorbitant, effectively leading to mass surveillance by the government of public 
communications. Costs to implement evaluation of all cybersecurity products developed 
in the United States would be significant and might serve as a bar to entry for smaller 
firms. 
4. Protect: Raise Level of Education, Training, and Awareness 
a. Definition 
Private Entities have sufficient education, training, and awareness to be cognizant 
of cyber threats, security policies and best practices and subsequently reduce the risk of 
cyber incidents and unintended data losses due to ignorance or negligence. Individuals 
have the necessary knowledge and awareness to protect themselves from cybercrimes and 
other forms of cyber intrusions. Enough education exists to support the growing need for 
cybersecurity professionals in both the public and private sectors. 
b. Type of Good Analysis 
In most cases, knowledge and awareness are recognized as public goods. 
Knowledge, once published or otherwise released, is generally non-excludable and non-
rivalled for consumption. In limited circumstances, they may be considered a club good. 
Entities may exclude others from access to knowledge through proprietary or 
classification controls. 
c. Possible Market Failures 
Raising level of education, training, and awareness is generally considered to be a 
merit good. This indicates that it will be under-produced and under-consumed because of 
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the difficulty in quantifying its benefits (Economics Online, 2017). It is also typically 
looked at as a public good, indicating both that it creates a positive externality and that it 
may face free rider problems. 
d. Potential for Market Self Correction 
The private sector has increasingly become aware of the benefit of cybersecurity 
training and awareness as evidenced by the growth of universities offering cybersecurity 
options (Ouyang, 2016). However, there are likely informational and distributional 
asymmetries in cyber threat awareness based on the resources available to different 
private entities. This issue becomes more pronounced for small businesses and 
individuals, which may lack the resources or motivation to pursue cybersecurity training 
and education. Due to the existence of these asymmetries and the positive externalities 
likely to result in raising these knowledge levels, there exists a necessity for government 
intervention. 
e. Positive Analysis 
The current level of U.S. government intervention could be classified as 
promotion and support. The U.S. government: advocates for increases in training; offers 
grants and subsidies for cybersecurity education; and provides training opportunities, 
tools and guidelines for private entities (DHS, 2017c; 2017d; 2017e; 2017f; 2017g; FTC, 
2017).  Additionally, the US has created cybersecurity curricula, as an indirect subsidy, 
for voluntary adoption by primary schools (GAO, 2017). 
Review of actions claimed in open source literature by the other nations sampled 
offered one departure from the U.S. model. The Israeli government has stated their plan 
is to restructure their education system to provide cybersecurity training in middle school, 
and incorporate cybersecurity as an elective in high school matriculation exams (Forbes, 
2017a). The Israeli model for education differs in general. Whereas the U.S. government 
indirectly supports the provision of public education through law and funding guidelines 
(public education is provided by state and local governments), the Israeli government can 
be considered to directly provide education. Regardless, a change in primary school 
curricula to introduce cyber sciences remains a viable policy option for consideration. 
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f. Analysis of Alternatives 
The authors conducted an analysis of alternatives on prospective, incremental 
policies (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14.  Analysis of Raise Level of Education, Training, and Awareness. 
The analysis focused on primary school education and ruled out direct provision, 
although it is the proposed course for Israel. As mentioned in the preceding sections, the 
Israeli government can be considered to provide education. To reach this same level of 
intervention, the United States would have to completely redesign its public education 
system, an unnecessary and incredibly inefficient course. 
Either an expansion of promotion and support or regulation for increased cyber 
sciences in education results in trade-offs with other academic disciplines in primary 
Function Outcome-Based Categories Potential Intervention (Policy Options) Intervention Costs
A) Status Quo (No Change) A) Incremental budget changes under current 
promotion and support.  Gov't accepts risks of 
increasing shortage of cybersecurity expertise and 
potentially falling behind other countries in cyber 
education.
B) Expand Promote and Support - Subsidize the 
creation and inclusion of cyber sciences into 
primary education curriculums.
B) 
1.  Expansion of funding for public schools.  Budget 
tradeoffs with other priorities or increased taxation. 
2. Tradeoffs with other education priorities (though 
cybersecurity likely fits into the push for more 
STEM education).
3. The cost of legislation and consensus building
4. As long as barriers to cybercrime remain low, 
educating more of the population on cyberspace may 
indirectly create more cybercriminals. (same point 
that the linkage is fuzzy between the two) 
5. The push for more cyber sciences in primary 
schools may create more of a short term drain on 
the scarce availability of cyber professionals. (we 
discussed and agreed that the shortage will be short-
term)
6. The rapid change in technology may drive rapid 
changes in the focus for cyber education, creating 
confusion in its provision.
Does subsidies have the effect of resulting in people 
flocking towards the profession (resulting in 
shortage of places instead)?
Current US Intervention Level
Promote & Support
Israel: Restructure education system to provide 
cybersecurity training in middle school, and 
incorporate cybersecurity as an elective in high 
school matriculation exams (Forbes, 2017a).
Functions and Categories Analysis of Alternatives
PROTECT (PR)
Raise Level of Education, Training, and 
Awareness: Private Entities have sufficient 
education, training, and awareness to be cognizant of 
cyber threats, security policies and best practices 
and subsequently reduce the risk of cyber incidents 
and unintended data losses due to ignorance or 
negligence.  Individuals have the necessary 
knowledge and awareness to protect themselves 
from cybercrimes and other forms of cyber 
intrusions.  Enough education exists to support the 
growing need for cybersecurity professionals in 
both the public and private sectors.
C) Regulate - Require cyber sciences education and 
training by law or executive order.
C) 
1. Funding and political capital for legislation.
2. Costs and tradeoffs identified in B.  Priority 
tradeoffs are potentially more severe as regulated 
curriculums may trump all subsidized priorities.
D) Provide - Directly provision cyber sciences 
education at the federal level.
D) 
1. All costs and tradeoffs identified in B & C.
2. Redesign of US public education system in part or 
whole (federal provision instead of state and local) 
and all tradeoffs associated.
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school curricula. The authors hypothesized that these trade-offs might be more severe if 
the United States pursued regulation as statutory requirements give unintended weight 
versus academic subjects without. 
Despite the trade-offs, expansion of cyber education seems a prudent course in the 
long run given the rapid growth of information systems technologies and the parallel 
growth in cyber threats. The US has already invested in the creation of curricula for 
primary school education (GAO, 2017). Subsidizing the creation of programs of 
instruction for primary education and altering funding guidelines to require education in 
fields tied to cybersecurity could address the informational and distributional 
asymmetries currently existing in the population. 
5. Protect: Advancement of Cybersecurity Knowledge and Technology 
a. Definition 
The extent of expertise and talent in the cybersecurity field grows with velocity 
greater than the development of cyber threats. Sufficient research and development is 
conducted to effectively secure Private Entities in cyberspace. 
b. Type of Good Analysis 
Basic research is often looked at as a public good. Once it is published, it is not 
easy to exclude populations from benefiting from it. The knowledge published is also not 
rivalled as one person’s use of it does not diminish another’s. 
c. Possible Market Failures 
Research and development (R&D) is often looked at as a public good with a 
positive externality, indicating that the benefits of providing it exceed the equilibrium 
determined by markets for it. It may also meet the definition of a merit good, indicating it 
will be undersupplied and under-consumed (Economics Online, 2017). 
d. Potential for Market Self Correction 
There is significant incentive in competitive markets to innovate and innovate 
fast. This holds true in the cybersecurity market. However, for competitive markets, this 
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incentive may only exist for knowledge and technologies that are in demand. Therefore, 
promising technologies may not receive sufficient attention and investment until the 
market sees potential for profit. Since cybersecurity technologies are usually directed at 
addressing specific threats (e.g., ransomware, viruses), it is possible that cybersecurity 
research will always lag behind optimal amounts without intervention. 
The UK recognized this market failure in its 2016 cybersecurity strategy (UK 
Cabinet Office, 2016). Within, the UK reflects that the pace of development resulting 
from their focus on leveraging market forces to drive innovation was not sufficient in 
keeping up with the evolution of cyber threats (UK Cabinet Office, 2016). Subsequently, 
the UK’s 2016 strategy calls for increases in government driven research (UK Cabinet 
Office, 2016). 
e. Positive Analysis 
The U.S. government’s current level of intervention is a combination of 
subsidized and directly funded research (DHS, 2017h; 2017i; NSA, n.d.; Grants.gov, 
2017). DHS alone funds over 30 research areas pertaining to cybersecurity (DHS, 
2017h). The NSA develops cryptographic tools and algorithms used to protect U.S. 
classified data (NSA, n.d.). These tools are occasionally offered commercially (NSA, 
n.d.). 
The other governments researched evidenced a similar approach. The UK plans to 
invest close to £1.9 billion over the next five years (from 2016 onward) (UK Cabinet 
Office, 2016). The Israeli government evidenced investment in R&D programs including 
the Meimad program (Deborah, 2017). Singapore invested $190 million into its national 
program, launched in 2013 (CSA, 2016). 
f. Analysis of Alternatives 
The authors conducted an analysis of alternatives on prospective, incremental 




Figure 15.  Analysis of Advancement of Cybersecurity Knowledge and 
Technology. 
Analysis of the four alternatives indicates that regulation or provision of research 
does not provide a net benefit. Regulating a set percentage of income to cybersecurity 
research and development may not spur innovation but would certainly require 
significant implementation costs. Attempting to provide all research and development 
would require significant increases in budget and might incentivize private entities to 
reduce their investments in cybersecurity. 
Qualitative analysis between remaining at the status quo and expanding 
promotion and support efforts fails to indicate a superior option. Increases to research 
subsidization would provide additional benefit to private entities but an ongoing, 
quantitative approach would be needed to compare the tradeoffs. Even at the current level 
of promotion, the United States invests in a broad catalogue of cybersecurity research 
Function Outcome-Based Categories Potential Intervention (Policy Options) Intervention Costs
A) Status Quo (no change) A) 
1. Incremental changes to costs associated with 
current distribution of advocation, subsidized R&D, 
and directly funded R&D.
2. Accept limited control over private research 
paths.
3. Potential losses due to research failures.
B) Expand Promote and Support - Increase the % the 
gov't spends on research and development.
B) 
1. Increase funding for cybersecurity expertise on 
staff/contract. Budget tradeoffs with other priorities 
or increased taxation. 
2. Costs/Tradeoffs associated with A.






Advancement of Cybersecurity Knowledge and 
Technology: The extent of expertise and talent in 
the cybersecurity field grows with velocity greater 
than the development of cyber threats.  Sufficient 
research and development is conducted to 
effectively secure Private Entities in cyberspace.
C) Regulate - Require Private Entities to allocate 
portion of their income to cybersecurity R&D 
and/or direct specific research paths.
C) 
1. Funding and political capital for legislation.
2. Funding to create/expand agency for enforcment.  
Includes increase funding for cybersecurity 
expertise on staff/contract.
3. Privacy/competition impacts of auditing private 
R&D.
4. Potential lawsuits.
5. Potential loss of innovation.
6. Budget tradeoffs with other priorities or 
increased taxation. 
D) Provide - Directly fund all R&D for all desired 
advances in the cybersecurity field.
D) 
1. Increase in funding for R&D.  
2. Increase funding for cybersecurity expertise on 
staff/contract to recommend/oversee research paths.
3. Budget tradeoffs with other priorities or 
increased taxation.
4. Accept all risk of loss for research failures.
5. Potential loss of private innovation.
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programs with no significant gaps identified in the literature review (DHS, 2017h; 2017i; 
NSA, n.d.; Grants.gov, 2017). 
6. Detect: Detection and Early Warning of Cyber Incidents 
a. Definition 
Private Entities are able to monitor the status and health of their information 
systems and assets, can detect and investigate any abnormal or suspicious ongoing 
activities in a timely manner, and obtain early warning of impending suspicious activity 
where possible. For individuals, this may involve picking up on indicators (e.g., high data 
usage on mobile devices) on owned devices, detecting suspicious activity on online 
accounts (e.g., email accounting sending spam to friends), or being alerted to the same by 
their service provider. 
b. Type of Good Analysis 
Detection of cyber incidents is excludable but non-rival and may be considered a 
club good. Entities may exclude others from detection data by technical or policy means. 
The cost of detection rises with scale but the informing of targets/victims is generally 
non-rivalled. 
c. Possible Market Failures 
While it may be considered a club good, detection of cyber incidents can provide 
a positive externality. If firm A detects malicious activity on its networks and notifies its 
cybersecurity (e.g., antivirus) provider, the provider can improve its products/services 
and potentially benefit the rest of its customer base. By sharing information on potential 
activity, private entities may also help limit the spread of malicious activity. However, 
there are disincentives that limit private firms’ willingness to share detection alerts: 




 Firms may avoid investing in detection capabilities if the data from same 
could be used to hold them liable for cyber incidents either criminally or 
civilly (Kaijankoski, 2015). 
 Firms may avoid reporting cyber incidents if the resulting publicity could 
decrease present or future income streams (Kaijankoski, 2015). 
Kaijankoski (2015) addresses these and other potential disincentives in great 
detail through a case study of the financial sector. 
d. Potential for Market Self Correction 
Firms do have incentive to detect cyber incidents as a way of preventing potential 
revenue or reputation losses. The degree to which firms invest is directly tied to their 
ability to qualify and quantify potential losses or identify losses in other firms/industries. 
Firms may share information if sharing is perceived to result in better value than not 
sharing. 
Since sharing organizations have grown (with government support) along with the 
commercialization of cyberspace, it is difficult to argue whether private entities as a 
whole could develop solutions to market failures sans government intervention. There is 
evidence in specific industries that information sharing does not develop without 
government intervention (Grants.gov, 2016; Lohrmann, 2014), but applying this pattern 
to the whole may be unwarranted. 
e. Positive Analysis 
The current level of U.S. government intervention is promotion and support. The 
government has formed public-private partnerships with ISAO’s as central/trusted points 
for receiving and distributing information between private entities and the government 
(NCI, n.d.; DHS, 2017j). Review of actions claimed in open source literature by the other 
nations sampled offered one, potentially significant, departure from the U.S. model. The 
Israel government plans to establish a “Digital Iron Dome” to provide early warning, 
detection and mitigation of cyberattacks (Hirsch & Gattegno, 2012). This plan is 
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reminiscent of the United States’ “EINSTEIN” program with one major difference; the 
U.S. program is solely implemented for federal networks. The authors consider the Israeli 
plan as intervening at the level of provision. 
f. Analysis of Alternatives 
The authors conducted an analysis of alternatives on prospective, incremental 
policies (Figure 16). 
 
Figure 16.  Analysis of Detection and Early Warning of Cyber Incidents. 
Analysis of the four alternatives indicates that regulation or provision of detection 
does not provide a net benefit. Providing a detection capability for all U.S. private entities 
would result in similar cost benefit tradeoffs to instantiating a national filter (section A-
3). Regulating the establishment of detection capabilities within all private entities would 
require significant governance and policing costs. The additional costs on private entities 
might prove a bar to entry for smaller firms with tighter profit margins. 
Function Outcome-Based Categories Potential Intervention (Policy Options) Intervention Costs
A) Status Quo (no change). A) Incremental budget changes under current 
promotion and support.  Gov't accepts risks of gaps 
in detection among Private Entities.
B) Expand Promote and Support.  B) 
1. Funding to subsidize creation/growth of ISAOs.  
Budget tradeoffs with other priorities or increased 
taxation.
2. Accept risk of creating monopolies for detection 
services.
Current US Intervention Level
Promote & Support
Key Differences
Israel: Establish Digital Iron Dome to link up the 
cyber defense professionals and systems across the 
country, in order to provide early warning, detection 
and mitigation of cyber attacks (Hirsch, 2012).
Functions and Categories Analysis of Alternatives
DETECT (DE)
Detection and Early Warning of Cyber 
Incidents:  Private Entities are able to monitor the 
status and health of their information systems and 
assets, can detect and investigate any abnormal or 
suspicious ongoing activities in a timely manner, 
and obtain early warning of impending suspicious 
activity where possible.  For individuals, this may 
involve picking up on indicators (e.g. high data usage 
on mobile devices) on his devices, detecting 
suspicious activity on his online accounts (e.g. 
email accounting sending spam to friends), or being 
alerted to the same by their service provider.
C) Regulate.  Require all private entities establish a 
minimum level of detection capability or contract 
with a firm/gov't agency to provide it.
C) 
1. Funding and political capital for legislation.
2. Funding to create/expand agency for enforcment.  
Includes increase funding for cybersecurity 
expertise on staff/contract.
3. Costs/Tradeoffs associated with B. 
4. Potential lawsuits.
D) Provide.  Use technical means to filter all 
Internet traffic.  Differing levels of employment 
could filter only traffic entering/leaving the country 
or all traffic in the country.  
D) 
1. Funding and political capital for legislation.
2. Funding to create/expand agency for enforcment.  
Includes increase funding for cybersecurity 
expertise on staff/contract. 
3. Significant privacy implications.
4. Potential lawsuits.
5. Repositories for detected data become attractive 
targets for cyber threats. 
6. Limited benefit given that significant portions of 




Qualitative analysis between remaining at the status quo and expanding 
promotion and support efforts fails to indicate a superior option. Subsidizing participation 
in information sharing organizations or developing detection capabilities may entice more 
participation from the private sector and increase cybersecurity. Quantitative analysis 
would be required to determine whether this added benefit exceeded the associated costs. 
7. Respond: Management and Containment of Cyber Incidents 
a. Definition 
Private Entities develop and test cyber incident response plans to prepare for 
cyber incidents. During incidents, Private Entities execute plans to contain incidents in a 
timely and efficient manner and communicate with external partners (law enforcement 
agencies, information sharing partners) to limit the overall effectiveness of the incident. 
Individuals know the basic steps to take when the victim of cyber incident and understand 
how and to what agencies to report. 
b. Type of Good Analysis 
The type of good for Response seems to vary with approach. The type and scale 
of implementation could be classified as any type of good. The institution of government 
CERTs and incident response teams reflect an example of a common pool resource (not 
excludable, but not easily scalable). Offensive or Defensive Cyber Operations, similar to 
other aspects of national defense provided by the military, reflect a public good. 
Information sharing, as identified earlier, reflects a club good. 
c. Possible Market Failures 
Developing and testing effective incident response plans addresses possible future 
scenarios instead of current, revenue producing operations yet requires the time, 
resources, and expertise of assets that could otherwise be focused on creating revenue. In 
the absence of a clear, perceived threat, incident response planning may not be funded to 
an optimal level. As such, it can be perceived as a merit good (Economics Online, 2017). 
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d. Potential for Market Self Correction 
Private entities do have incentive to pursue a level of capability to respond to 
incidents, which varies with specific entity and their perception of the likelihood of being 
targeted and vulnerable. 
Where self-correction likely fails to provide the optimal level of response 
capability is in allocating the necessary time and expertise to fully address scenarios and 
test those plans. In addition there are many functions, inherent to the government, 
necessary to holistically respond to a cyber incident. Private entities are not authorized to 
enforce the nations laws nor conduct military operations unless specifically under the 
umbrella of a government action. From a cyber perspective, private entities are not 
authorized to “hack back” when the victim of a cyber incident (HSC, 2017). 
e. Positive Analysis 
The general level of U.S. government intervention is promotion and support for 
the formulation and testing of organizational incident response plans and for preliminary, 
technical execution. Where response requires transition to an inherent government 
function such as foreign diplomacy, military action, or law enforcement the government 
fully provides the service (the authors incorporate most of these actions in the 
government function of this framework). Review of actions claimed in open source 
literature by the other nations sampled did not offer any significant departures from the 
U.S. model. 
f. Analysis of Alternatives 
The authors conducted an analysis of alternatives on prospective, incremental 




Figure 17.  Analysis of Management and Containment of Cyber Incidents. 
Analysis of the four alternatives indicates that regulation or provision of response 
include a significant amount of additional tradeoff. Technology may allow for economies 
of scale in response provision, but does not address the privacy impacts of a national 
regulation or provision. These costs limit the potential net benefit for implementation. 
Qualitative analysis between remaining at the status quo and expanding 
promotion and support efforts fails to indicate a superior option. Quantitative analysis 
would be required to determine whether this added benefit exceeded the associated costs. 
8. Recover: Recovery from Cyber Incidents 
a. Definition 
In the aftermath of a cyberattack, Private Entities have the capabilities necessary 
to recover operations, assets, and data to an acceptable, pre-incident state. 
Function Outcome-Based Categories Potential Intervention (Policy Options) Intervention Costs
A) Status Quo (no change). A) Incremental budget changes under current 
promotion and support.  Gov't accepts risks of 
absent/ineffective response by Private Entities to 
cyber incident.
B) Expand Promote and Support. B) 
1. Funding to subsidize creation/growth/operation of 
ISAOs and CERTs.  Budget tradeoffs with other 
priorities or increased taxation.
2. Accept risk of creating monopolies for detection 
services.






Management and Containment of Cyber 
Incidents:  Private Entities develop and test cyber 
incident response plans to prepare for cyber 
incidents.  During incidents, Private Entities 
execute plans to contain incidents in a timely and 
efficient manner and communicate with external 
partners (law enforcement agencies, information 
sharing partners, DHS) to limit the overall 
effectiveness of the incident.  Individuals know the 
basic steps to take when the victim of cyber incident 
and know how and to what agencies to report.
C) Regulate.  Require Private Entities to develop and 
certify response capabilities or partner with a 
certified firm/gov't agency for provision.
C)  
1. Funding and political capital for legislation.
2. Funding to create/expand agency for enforcment.  
Includes increase funding for cybersecurity 
expertise on staff/contract.
3. Costs/Tradeoffs associated with B. 
4. Potential lawsuits.
D) Provide.  A gov't agency conducts/contracts all 
response to cyber incidents.
D) 
1. Funding and political capital for legislation.
2. Funding to create/expand agency for enforcment.  
Includes increase funding for cybersecurity 
expertise on staff/contract.
3. Significant privacy implications.
4. Potential lawsuits.
5. Repositories for detected data become attractive 
targets for cyber threats.
6. Requires a level of Regulate or Provide for the 




b. Type of Good Analysis 
Like Response, the type of good for Recovery seems to vary with approach. The 
type and scale of implementation could be classified as any type of good. The institution 
of government CERTs and incident response teams reflect an example of a common pool 
resource (not excludable, but not easily scalable). 
c. Possible Market Failures 
Like with Response, proactively devoting resources to Recovery assets competes 
with requirements to sustain current, revenue producing operations. In the absence of a 
clear, perceived threat, incident response planning will not be funded to an optimal level. 
As such, it can be perceived as a merit good. 
Recovery post event varies depending on the assets of firms and the trade-offs 
between the cost of recovery and the projected revenues from it. Much like Risk 
Management, the valuation of these trade-offs would be conducted from the private 
entities’ points of view and might ignore the full value of the impact on others. This 
results in the possibility of negative externalities. Small businesses, in particular, may 
underinvest in recovery capabilities. 
d. Potential for Market Self Correction 
For data, the reduction in the cost of storage and availability of cloud technology 
makes the setup of backups more attractive for many private firms. The potential 
reduction in costs for computing systems, in general, from developments in cloud 
technology may reduce the impact or duration of cyber incidents on systems or services. 
A pairing with good encryption may further mitigate both the impacts of data loss the 
privacy concerns of large, aggregate data stores. 
However, evidence indicates that there are industries that may not be able to 
withstand or recover quickly enough from a significant cyber incident (DHS, 2013). 
Additionally, many firms lack the maturity to holistically develop plans to provide a 
socially optimal level of redundancy and availability (HSC, 2017). 
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e. Positive Analysis 
The U.S. government promotes and supports recovery through services offered by 
US-CERT on a voluntary request basis (DHS, 2017a). None of the four countries 
discussed in this paper differ much in their approach to support recovery. 
f. Analysis of Alternatives 
The authors conducted an analysis of alternatives on prospective, incremental 
policies (Figure 18). 
 
Figure 18.  Analysis of Recovery from Cyber Incidents. 
Analysis of the four alternatives indicates that regulation or provision of response 
include a significant amount of additional tradeoff. Cloud computing technology 
simplifies data recovery in most instances but there are data and capabilities for which 
cloud computing is not an ideal solution (e.g., for hosting confidential data). 
Additionally, cloud computing does not solve all of the impacts of cyber incidents (e.g., 
physical damage such as energy grid failures tied to failure of a control system). The 
costs in manpower and money may exceed the benefits of regulation or provision. 
Function Outcome-Based Categories Potential Intervention (Policy Options) Intervention Costs
A) Status Quo (no change). A) Gov't accepts risks of ineffective recovery by 
private entities to cyber incident, resulting in long 
downtimes of key services or loss of critical 
information.
B) Expand Promote and Support.  B) 
1. Funding to subsidize growth of CERTs.  Budget 
tradeoffs with other priorities or increased taxation.






Recovery from Cyber Incidents:  In the aftermath 
of a cyberattack, Private Entities have the 
capabilities necessary to recover operations, assets, 
and data to an acceptable, pre-incident state.  
C) Regulate.  Require private entities to develop and 
certify recovery capabilities or partner with a 
certified firm/gov't agency for provision.
C)  
1. Funding and political capital for legislation.
2. Funding to create/expand agency for enforcement.  
Includes increase funding for cybersecurity 
expertise on staff/contract.
D) Provide.  A gov't agency conducts/contracts all 
recovery to cyber incidents.
D) 
1. Funding and political capital for legislation.
2. Funding to create/expand agency for enforcment.  
Includes increase funding for cybersecurity 
expertise on staff/contract.




Qualitative analysis between remaining at the status quo and expanding 
promotion and support efforts fails to indicate a superior option. Quantitative analysis 
would be required to determine whether this added benefit exceeded the associated costs. 
9. Government: Provide Inherent Government Functions for 
Cybersecurity 
a. Definition 
This function recognizes government functions that do not cleanly fall in any of 
the NIST functions, yet may impact the cybersecurity of Private Entities or cyberspace as 
a whole. 
b. Discussion 
In line with designation of this function, most of the goods and services within 
would be classified as either public or common resource. The related policies make up a 
significant portion of a national government’s approach to cybersecurity. 
However, to undertake a true comparative analysis between governments would 
require access to restricted or classified information. This study relied solely on 
unclassified, open-source information. In open sources, the approach of the compared 
governments does not appear to have any major differences. Each of the countries 
sampled wield the instruments of national power in cyberspace as in other domains. As 
identified in this literature, the characteristics of their approaches differ, but each 
government approach incorporates policies reminiscent of the character of the others. For 
example, the UK appears to favor deterrence versus the U.S. focus on international 
cooperation (Obama, 2011). The United States, however, does implement policy to deter 
cyber aggression. For these reasons, we do not further explore an analysis of alternatives 
for this function. 
10. Summary of Analysis 








IDENTIFY Understanding of assets and 
information 
Status quo.
Risk management Status quo.  
PROTECT Management of assets and 
information 
Status quo.
Raise level of education, training, 
and awareness 
Expand Promote and Support. 
 Advancement of Cybersecurity 
Knowledge and Technology 
Status quo. 
DETECT Detection and Early Warning of 
Cyber Incidents 
Status quo.
RESPOND Management and Containment of 
Cyber Incidents 
Status quo.
RECOVER Recovery from Cyber Incidents Status quo.
GOVERNMENT Provide Inherent Government 








V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
In the preceding chapters, the authors: introduced the threats existing in 
cyberspace and the problem qualifying the U.S. government response to them; reviewed 
the existing, open source literature regarding the cybersecurity approaches of the United 
States, UK, Israel, and Singapore and potential methods for comparing cybersecurity 
policy options; developed and applied a framework to compare and analyze cybersecurity 
policy options. 
In this chapter, the authors highlight the findings of their research to make the 
following recommendations for both United States and academic consideration: 
1. The United States should increase the level of incentives offered for 
primary school cybersecurity education. The United States should pursue a 
cost benefit analysis to identify the extent to which to focus these 
subsidization efforts. 
2. The United States should continue efforts to improve and reduce the 
complexity of its information sharing procedures. 
A. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. There is Significant Similarity in the ways National Governments 
approach Cybersecurity.  
A review of the open source literature indicates that the United States, UK, Israel, 
and Singapore each have a different focus in their respective approaches for the 
cybersecurity of private entities. The research indicates that the United States is more 
liberal in its approach, choosing to champion international cooperation and encourage 
private sector adoption of cybersecurity standards. Research indicates that UK selects a 
deterrent approach, investing heavily to build up its detection and retaliation capabilities, 
positioning itself as a daunting target for would-be cyber attackers. Strategy documents 
infer that Israel focuses on protection as it builds a “protective shield” over its entire 
cyber infrastructure. As a key financial and transportation hub in Asia, Singapore appears 
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to take a focus on cyber security resiliency, concentrating on how cyber incidents are 
managed and how to quickly recover from them. 
Despite the differences in focus, comparative analysis of positive policies reveals 
a significant amount of homogeneity in the approaches of the four governments. A near 
exhaustive search revealed only five policies that appeared to significantly diverge from 
the approach of the United States. The authors conjectured two reasons for this finding. 
First, as identified in the NIST CSF, there are a number of common tasks required for a 
holistic approach to cybersecurity, regardless of focus (Sedgewick, 2014). This seems to 
hold as true for governments as firms. Second, governments learn from one another and 
from the best practices of industry. 
2. The Options available to National Governments for approaching 
Cybersecurity are Limited. 
Daniel Benoliel (2014) concluded in his analysis that governments that value the 
rights and privacy of their constituents are effectively limited to two forms of 
intervention for cybersecurity: standards setting and information sharing. The results of 
this study support his claim. Comparative analysis of the four governments revealed very 
few instances where one of the governments indicated an attempt to either regulate or 
fully provide an aspect of cybersecurity. Further, the analysis of alternatives for potential 
changes in U.S. cybersecurity measures indicated that the costs of regulating or fully 
providing any facet of cybersecurity significantly outweigh the related benefits. The 
authors reasoned that governments which value the rights and privacy of their 
constituencies (a list which includes each of the nations researched) will face significant 
hurdles providing or regulating cybersecurity services if those services threaten privacy 
concerns, potentially explaining the common preference for public private partnerships. 
As the programs are still in early stages, according to the literature reviewed, it will be 
interesting to see how the governments of Singapore and Israel address the potential 




3. For most of the Outcome Based Categories, the United States uses the 
Appropriate Level of Government Intervention. These Categories 
retain room for Procedural Improvements. 
For most of the outcome based categories derived from the NIST CSF, the 
analysis of alternatives indicated that the U.S. approach of promotion and support is the 
adequate level of intervention for the cybersecurity of private entities. From a qualitative 
perspective, the cost of intervening to a greater degree significantly outweighs the added 
benefits. Sans quantitative data, the analysis did not provide sufficient evidence to 
indicate the need for significant expansion in the level of promotion and support for most 
of the outcome based categories.  
While the U.S. approach to cybersecurity in many of the outcome based 
categories is adequate for reaching desired outcomes, there remains evidence of room for 
procedural improvements in the execution of policy. Of note is testimony from private 
industry representatives highlighting a need to improve the context of data shared 
between the government, ISACs, and private industry (HSC, 2017). Further research 
should be pursued to refine the process for sharing information. 
4. The United States needs to Expand its Support to closing the 
Cybersecurity Education Gap. 
The analysis of alternatives did identify one gap between the United States’ 
current approach to providing cybersecurity to private entities and the desired outcome of 
the approach. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported U.S. government 
and private organizations have problems recruiting and maintaining a qualified 
cybersecurity workforce (2017). To bridge the existing and growing informational and 
workforce gaps in the country, the United States offers a range of direct and indirect 
subsidies to incentivize cybersecurity education, training, and awareness efforts including 
the development of cybersecurity curricula for voluntary primary school adoption (GAO, 
2017; DHS, 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017f, 2017g). The analysis of alternatives indicated 
that any new curricula introduced into public education systems must compete against all 
others for the scarce time teachers have access to students. Further, public school systems 
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that implement cybersecurity education must compete with the already stressed market 
for qualified cybersecurity expertise.  
To meet the long term need for cybersecurity professionals in both the public and 
private sectors, the United States should increase the level of incentives offered for 
primary school cybersecurity education. Current incentives seem weighted more heavily 
toward near term workforce gaps (scholarships and grants for advanced education and 
training programs for the workplace). The indirect incentives for primary schools 
(curricula development), while important, appear insufficient to drive change. The United 
States should consider altering the guidelines for education funding to SLTT 
governments to include requirements for science, technology, engineering, and math to 
include the cyber sciences. Further research should be pursued to provide a quantitative 
extent to which the government should expand its subsidization efforts. 
5. The U.S. Organization for Cybersecurity is Complex. 
Review of the open source literature on the structure of the U.S. approach to 
cybersecurity revealed an incredibly complex organization. Responsibilities for 
cybersecurity are allocated to a multitude of government agencies as part of a “whole of 
government” approach. A succession of legislation and executive policy documents 
indicated incremental refinements to reduce this complexity and reinforce DHS’ 
authorities (Lowery, 2014; Schonberg, 2013). Key examples of these efforts include the 
instantiation of coordination centers in the DHS, ODNI, and DOJ to improve the flow of 
information (PPD 41, 2016). 
The complexity of the U.S. organization for cybersecurity may result in ambiguity 
and confusion in response to cyber threats (HSC, 2017). Further research should be 
pursued to simplify information sharing processes between the relevant agencies. 
B. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND RESPONSE 
There are a number of arguments that may be made to challenge the validity or 
value of this study or its findings.  
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This study may be attacked for its lack of either quantifiable or classified data. 
When the authors originally approached the subject area for this study, they envisioned a 
detailed, quantitative analysis supported by data from open sources. An intensive 
literature review revealed that there are few open sources for cybersecurity data. The data 
that exists is usually either pulled from surveys of a sample population or another 
internally developed scale. Attempts to aggregate these sources failed to create a 
complete and reliable set for analysis. It is likely that classified data sources could 
provide a more complete picture but introduce limitations to access and distribution. The 
qualitative approach allowed for completion of the main research objectives and laid the 
foundation for future research using quantified or classified data. 
This study may also be criticized for being too broad and high level. While the 
study was developed from an extensive review of the literature, it is true that the focus is 
at a very high level. Cybersecurity is a very broad field, requiring researchers to make 
tradeoffs between breadth and depth in any study. For the purpose of identifying potential 
gaps in a national government’s cybersecurity policy, a broad and high level approach 
seemed appropriate.  
Finally, the existence of similar studies (including comparative analysis) of 
national cybersecurity policies could be used to question the value added by this study. 
There have certainly been many studies into the United States’ or other nations’ 
cybersecurity policies. A number of them contributed to this study. There are two points 
on which this study may add value to the discussion. 
Most studies that evaluate cybersecurity from a normative standpoint do so in 
aggregate; arguing whether cybersecurity as a whole warrants government intervention. 
While such arguments are helpful in policy analysis, they do not specify the aspects of 
cybersecurity a government should or should not provide. By first defining a list of 
desired outcome based categories, this study allowed for the analysis of specific areas for 
government focus. 
Other national cybersecurity policy analyses begin by deriving measures of 
performance before assessing the effectiveness of individual measures. In contrast, this 
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study began by categorizing the outcomes of a successful cybersecurity approach before 
evaluating current and potential performance measures that contribute to the desired 
outcomes. This change in perspective may serve to better judge the benefit of existing or 
proposed cybersecurity measures. Additionally, this analysis is built from the existing US 
standards recommended for use by both the public and private sectors and may facilitate 
easier use and communication by practitioners. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This study sought to identify how the U.S. government protects private entities 
(organizations and individuals) in cyberspace and determine if its role should expand in 
light of known threats. Through a comparative analysis using outcome based categories 
derived from the NIST CSF, the research uncovered a complex and largely 
comprehensive U.S. approach. The results of the research recommend areas of focus for 
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